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Philadelphia Wage Dispute Lawyers: Third Circuit Rules That Overtime Class Action Cannot Proceed In Arbitration

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Recently, the Third Circuit weighed in on the issue of whether it is up to courts or arbitrators to decide if a class action lawsuit should be adjudicated in court, or in an arbitral forum. This case also dealt with the issue of whether an employment agreement that is silent on the issue of class arbitration permits employees to proceed on a class-wide basis on that basis. In Opalinski v. Robert Half International, the 3rd Circuit sided against the plaintiffs who wished to proceed on a class wide basis in arbitration. The case involved employees of the placement firm, Robert Half.

The plaintiffs were two former staffing managers at Robert Half in New Jersey. The men claim that they were improperly classified as exempt from overtime pay, and wrongfully denied such pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The defense argued that when the men signed their employment contracts, they waived their right to resolve employment disputes in court. Their contracts provided that such disputes must be submitted to arbitration. However, their contracts were silent in regards to class wide arbitration. The two men brought an action on behalf of themselves and other putative class members who were denied overtime pay.

Shortly after filing the claim, a United States Dihttps://overtimestrict Court judge granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of the employees’ individual claims. However, the district court determined that the arbitral forum had jurisdiction to decide whether class wide arbitration was permissible.  The arbitrator found that such claims could proceed on a class basis in arbitration – and when the defendant sought to overturn this ruling in district court, the trial court sided with the plaintiffs.  Subsequently, the defendant appealed this ruling and the 3rd Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the decision lies with the courts. The United States Supreme Court then declined to hear the case on appeal. After the case was remanded, the district court granted Robert Half’s motion to dismiss, finding that parties cannot be compelled to submit to class wide arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding such.

The plaintiffs appealed this decision yet again, and the 3rd Circuit recently ruled against them, finding it had already “explicitly decided,” in a precedential opinion in this same case, that the question of arbitrability of class claims is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide.

Philadelphia Wage Dispute Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Clients in All Types of Wage Dispute Cases

At Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, we routinely handle FLSA claims involving unpaid overtime. Our respected Philadelphia wage dispute lawyers are prepared to answer whatever questions you may have. To schedule a confidential consultation, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

 

 

 

Philadelphia Consumer Protection Lawyers Discuss the Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law

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Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq. (“UTPCPL”) is Pennsylvania’s consumer protection law. It seeks to prevent “[un]fair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce….” Id. § 201–3. Its aim is to protect the public from unfair or deceptive business practices.

The UTPCPL provides a private right of action for anyone who “suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property” because of an unlawful method, act or practice. See id. § 201–9.2(a). Upon a finding of liability, the court has the discretion to award “up to three times the actual damages sustained” and provide any additional relief the court deems proper. Id.  There are 20 enumerated practices which constitute actionable “unfair methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Id. § 201–2(4)(i)–(xx). The UTPCPL also contains a catchall provision which refers to “[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion of or misunderstanding.” Id. § 201–2(4)(xxi).

In order to establish a private right of action under the UTPCPL, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he/she detrimentally relied upon the deceptive practice of the defendant and that the plaintiff suffered harm as a result of this reliance. Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 863 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2004).  It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the level of reliance that normally accompanies a common law fraud claim.  This means a plaintiff must show not just reliance on the misrepresentation, but also that the reliance was justifiable.  Id. at 11.

Philadelphia Consumer Protection Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Consumers in Claims for Fraud and Unfair Trade Practices

If you have been defrauded or subject to an unfair or deceptive business practice, you may have a valid claim under the UTPCPL, among other potential causes of action. Philadelphia consumer fraud lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green will seek maximum compensation for your damages. To learn more about how we may be able to help you, call us at 215-574-0600 or contact us online today.

 

 

 

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers Discuss the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representative Act

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The Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representative Act, 43 Pa. Stat. § 1471 et seq. (“PCSRA”) provides statutory remedies for certain sales representatives when they are not paid timely commissions. Under the PCSRA, a “principal shall pay a sales representative all commissions due at the time of termination within 14 days after termination” and “all commissions that become due after termination within 14 days of the date such commissions become due.” 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 1473–74. If a principal “willfully” violates these provisions, then the sales representative may bring a civil action to collect all unpaid commissions plus exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees. Id. § 1475. The Act thus governs the payment of commissions owed by a “principal” to a “sales representative,” and a defendant can only be liable if the plaintiff is a “sales representative” as that term is used in the Act.

A key factor in determining whether you have a claim under the PCSRA is to understand how the law defines the terms “sales representative” and “principal”.

The PCSRA defines the term “sales representative” as follows:

“Sales representative.” A person who contracts with a principal to solicit wholesale orders from retailers rather than consumers and who is compensated, in whole or in part, by commission. The term does not include one who places orders or purchases for his own account for resale or one who is an employee of a principal.

Id. § 1471.

Thus, a “sales representative” is someone who solicits wholesale orders from “retailers” rather than “consumers.”

A “principal” is defined by the PCSRA as any person who does all of the following:

(1) Engages in the business of manufacturing, producing, importing or distributing a product for sale to customers who purchase such products for resale.

(2) Utilizes sales representatives to solicit orders for such product.

(3) Compensates sales representatives, in whole or in part, by commission.

Id.

Finally, a sales representative should be cautioned against bringing a meritless claim against a principal under the PCSRA.  If judgment is entered for the principal and the court determines that the action was brought frivolously, then the principal will be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. § 1475.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Sales Commissioned Representatives in Claims to Recover Unpaid Commissions

If you are owed unpaid commissions, you may have a valid claim under the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representative Act, among other potential causes of action. Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green will seek maximum compensation for your damages. To learn more about how we may be able to help you, call us at 215-574-0600 or contact us online today.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Foreign Arbitration

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In a recent decision out of the Second Circuit, a U.S. Court of Appeals held that American courts can enforce an international arbitral award notwithstanding the fact that it was annulled by a court in a foreign country.

In Commisa v.Pemex, a Mexican subsidiary of a Texas corporation (Commisa) sued a state-owned Mexican oil company (Pemex), regarding several contracts to build infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, after a Mexican arbitral tribunal awarded the Texas company over $350 million. A Mexican court later set aside the award. Commisa then sought enforcement in the United States, and a New York district court judge held that the award should be enforced. The Second Circuit affirmed his ruling.

The Second Circuit noted that under the Panama Convention, American courts must enforce the award unless one of seven defenses enumerated in the Panama Convention is established. Although one of those seven defenses (a set aside) was satisfied, the judge ruled that he was constrained by the prudential concern of international comity—and that the Mexican decision violated international policy.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, P.C. frequently represent Businesses in Arbitration

If your business is involved in a commercial dispute that is subject to arbitration, the Philadelphia business lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green may be able to help you. To learn more or schedule a consultation, call us at 215-574-0600 or contact us online today.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Written Contracts

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Written Contracts May be Modified by Subsequent Oral Agreement

It is the well-settled law of Pennsylvania that a written contract may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement by either words or conduct; and an oral modification of a written contract may be implied from a course of conduct, including acquiesce in the modification through a course of conduct consistent with acceptance.

In Muchow v. Schaffner, 119 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956), Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written contract in which Plaintiff was to construct a building for Defendant that met certain specifications. After the agreement was executed, Plaintiff realized he could not build the building as specified in the agreement because the ground would not support it. Plaintiff called Defendant and a conversation took place in which Defendant agreed orally to the new specifications that contradicted what was written in the written contract. It was proven at trial that Defendant knew the extra work would not have to be done but for the oral agreement. When the building was finished it was materially different from the original agreement and Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff, and relied on the parol evidence rule. The Court sided with the Plaintiff and found the parol evidence rule did not bar the evidence of the oral agreement.

Furthermore, a written contract may be modified by a new contract implied from conduct or an express oral agreement, even where there is a provision expressly prohibiting non-written modifications, and a party’s conduct in accepting an oral or implied modification of a written contract can result in a waiver of language requiring all modifications to be written. First Nat’l Bank of Pa. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 824 F.2d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 1987).

For more information, call our Philadelphia  business lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Communications Decency Act

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State Law Claims Such as Defamation and Negligence Barred under the Communications Decency Act

Under the Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (“CDA”), a party is immune to state law claims relating to information published on the Internet such as defamation, misappropriation of likeness, breach of contract, and negligence. § 230 of the CDA states that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.

For example, these provisions bar state law claims against interactive computer services for publishing content obtained from another information content provider. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293 (D.N.H. 2008). The intent of this provision is to preclude courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that the CDA provides immunity to similar claims like misappropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and negligence. Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 242 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) citing (Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.) (§ 230 affords immunity from suit on claims of invasion of privacy, misappropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and negligence)).

For more information, call our business lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Trademark Lawyers: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act

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Protecting Internet Service Providers from Claims of Copyright Infringement

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, (“DMCA”), is a law that heightens the penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet. The DMCA provides a safe-harbor provision for internet service providers from monetary liability under the Act as long as they comply with the conditions set forth in § 512. An internet service provider is defined as

“an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received and/or a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A).”

Companies like Google and Amazon are considered internet service providers because they merely provide the online services that allow third party users to sell goods. Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006) aff’d, 242 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) and Hendrickson v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

Internet service providers are protected under the Act’s safe-harbor provision as long as the provider: does not have actual knowledge of infringing content on its servers, does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity if the provider has the ability to control such activity, and acts quickly to remove or disable access to infringing material after receiving notice that the material is infringing.

For more information, call our trademark lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Trademark Lawyers: Disparaging Trademarks

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Recently, an all Asian-American band called The Slants made headlines because the United States Patent and Trademark Office “USPTO” denied their application for a trademark on grounds that their name was a racially disparaging term. Trademark registration is considered “government speech,” and thus is regulated.

Although American citizens have freedom of speech, and the right to exercise that privilege, the government cannot sanction disparaging language. In other words, although a band can call themselves The Slants, and more generally, anyone can use any “trademark” or name they like regardless of how disparaging it may be, the government cannot register an offensive trademark. The so-called disparagement provision of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits registration of marks that “may disparage” any person or group.

The Slants are a Portland, Oregon based rock band founded by musician Simon Shiao Tam. Tam states that, as an Asian-American, he named the band in an effort to reclaim power from a racial slur that had been used against him his entire life. According to Tam, the band’s name also refers to “guitar slants” and the band members’ unique slant on life.

Enforcement of the Lanham Act is Unconstitutional

After the USPTO denied the application pursuant to the disparagement provision, Tam filed suit. The matter is currently pending before the United States Supreme Court. Before the case made its way to the Supreme Court, a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional. The Circuit judges noted that regardless of their personal feelings about the trademark at issue, or any other disparaging marks, the First Amendment forbids government regulators to deny registration on grounds that it finds the speech likely to offend others. The Court went so far as to note that Tam’s role as a musician is to weigh in on cultural and political discussions about race and society that are “within the heartland” of speech protected by the First Amendment. The issue currently before the United States Supreme Court on appeal is whether the disparagement provision is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

A number of so-called interested parties have filed amicus briefs in this case. One brief, submitted to the Court by the Cato Institute, takes issue with the fact that the government should not get to decide what is or is not a racial slur.

One related case that may be instructive involves the registration of the NFL team named the Redskins. A District Court upheld the cancelation of the Redskins trademark on grounds that it may disparage Native Americans. The Court noted that because trademark registration is “government speech,” it is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.

Philadelphia Trademark Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, P.C. Have Extensive Experience Litigating Trademarks

If you have questions about registering a trademark or protecting an existing mark, the Philadelphia intellectual property lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green can help. We have decades of combined experience in intellectual property law. With offices conveniently located in Philadelphia, we serve clients throughout Pennsylvania and South Jersey. Schedule a consultation today by calling us at 215-574-0600 or by completing our online contact form.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Arbitration Clauses Not Always Enforceable or Advisable

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Arbitration is an alternative to litigating in court and it may lead to a cheaper and more expedient result. It also may be favorable to both sides in certain situations, particularly when it concerns two equal parties with access to equivalent resources saving time and money for all concerned. However, arbitration is often a disadvantage when the playing field is not level,  and for that reason, it is a common tool used by big business against consumers and employees.

Recently the American multinational technology conglomerate, Cisco, tried to force a lawsuit by one of its employees into arbitration and lost in San Francisco Superior Court. An employee filed an age discrimination claim against Cisco. The company responded by stating that the employee had given up the right to sue when she signed her employment contract because it included a clause that said any disputes must be settled by binding arbitration. However, the clause about arbitration was buried within a form that was mainly about intellectual property claims – something every employee must sign in order to be able to work at Cisco.

Judge Harold Kahn ruled that in effect, Cisco had surprised the employee with the arbitration requirement by putting the language in one paragraph on page five of a seven page, single spaced document about proprietary information. Moreover, the language stated that the employee was also obligated to pay half the costs of any employment disputes that went to arbitration, which is against California regulations.

Arbitration is a Common Practice for Companies

Cisco is not the only company trying to use arbitration to its advantage. Wells Fargo is still recovering from the scandal that broke when the practice of opening multiple accounts in a customer’s name without their knowledge became public. Victims seeking justice were forced into binding arbitration by the bank. The original accounts had a clause about arbitration which the bank said also applied to any subsequent disputes. Due to the fact that most results of arbitration cases are not a matter of public record, the scale of the Wells Fargo scandal was kept under wraps for longer than it would have been in a court of law.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, P.C. Defend Those Being Forced Into Arbitration

Consumers and employees need to be aware of arbitration clauses because they are extremely common. At Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, we have experience representing consumers and individuals in arbitration matters, and in court.

If you have a matter that is in arbitration, or you are concerned about signing a contract with an arbitration clause, please feel free to contact the Philadelphia business lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, P.C.. Call us at 215-574-0600 to schedule an appointment or contact us online. We serve clients throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

 

 

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers: Sexual Orientation Discrimination

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In a recent groundbreaking ruling, a Pennsylvania district court found that discrimination based on someone’s perceived sexual orientation falls under the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The individual involved in the case was a homosexual man employed as a telemarketer by Scott Medical Health Center. The lawsuit alleged his manager made offensive and unwanted comments to him about his sexual orientation several times a week. He further claims that he was asked explicit questions and was exposed to homophobic slurs. The man claims he reported the conduct to the health center’s president, but no action was taken to stop the harassment. Ultimately, the man says that he was constructively discharged because the treatment he endured created a hostile work environment.

The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that perceived sexual orientation was not protected under Title VII.  However, the court ruled against defendants, finding no meaningful difference existed between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination because of sex. The court noted that sex stereotyping included assumptions about how a person’s sexuality should conform to their sex and gender. The court ultimately likened the plaintiff’s experience to that of a female employee who is told to dress more femininely, or wear make-up and jewelry in order to achieve promotion. The court cited recent decisions across the U.S. Courts that have increasingly been finding that sexual orientation is a Title VII protected trait. The court also drew from the Supreme Court opinion legalizing same-sex marriage.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Employees in Sexual Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Claims

If you have suffered an adverse employment action such as failure to hire, termination, or denial of a promotion on the grounds of your sexual orientation or because of your gender, you may have a valid discrimination claim. Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green will fight back against injustice. We seek maximum compensation for damages suffered as a result of discrimination. To learn more about how we can help you, call us at 215-574-0600 or contact us online today.