Category: Uncategorized


Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Copyright Infringement Lawsuit

By ,

The Supreme Court recently weighed in on certain copyright infringement issues that have long been unsettled in American law. First, the Court ruled that the resale of foreign-manufactured books in the United States does not violate the “first-sale” provision. In a second related lawsuit, the Court found that the award of attorneys’ fees to the reseller was appropriate. The case, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., has important implications for intellectual property litigants, because it clearly sets forth the factors courts must consider in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.

The case arose when Kirtsaeng instructed family and friends living in Thailand to purchase copies of John Wiley & Sons’ books and ship them back to him in the United States. The books were priced substantially less in Thailand than in the U.S., so Kirtsaeng resold them for a profit. Wiley then sued him for copyright infringement.

The lawsuit alleged that Kirtsaeng infringed Wiley’s right to exclusive distribution under Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act. Kirtsaeng claimed that his purchases and resales were protected under the “first-sale” provision. Wiley’s rebuttal that the provision does not apply to books manufactured abroad was not accepted by the Court, who ruled in favor of Kirtsaeng.

In a second round of litigation arising out of the same set of facts, Kirtsaeng argued that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act’s discretionary fee shifting provision, which allows a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party. Author of the opinion, Justice Kagan, stated that payment of attorneys’ fees is important to uphold the intent behind the copyright act, which aims to enrich the general public through access to creative works.

Kagan stated that the reasonableness of the losing party’s position should be taken into account in awarding attorneys’ fees, along with other so-called “Fogerty factors,” including:

  • The frivolousness of the losing party’s position.
  • The losing party’s motivation for bringing the suit.
  • Objective unreasonableness of the losing party’s claim.
  • The need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deference.

This decision is important for any intellectual property litigant for many reasons, one being that it can help inform a decision whether to settle and for how much. For example, if a litigant’s claim is weak, knowing that going to trial could result in having to pay attorneys’ fees should serve to encourage settlement.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Have Extensive Experience in All Aspects of Business Litigation

Philadelphia business lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. have extensive experience in all types of business tort litigation, including complex copyright infringement matters. With offices conveniently located in Philadelphia, we represent businesses throughout Pennsylvania and South Jersey. To schedule a consultation, call us at 215-574-0600 or contact us online today.

OSHA Fines Epic Health Services $98K After Investigation of Sexual Assault

By ,

In February of 2016, an employee filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) after being sexually assaulted by a home care client. The health care worker was employed by AndVenture, which does business as Epic Health Services, and is one of the largest providers of pediatric home health and therapy services for medically frail and chronically ill children.

Prior to OSHA’s investigation, Epic Health had received numerous prior complaints of sexual and physical assaults by employees while working. OSHA found that Epic Health willfully violated regulations involving workplace violence and that Epic Health had no system for reporting threats or incidents of violence. In addition to the citation, Epic Health must also pay a $98,000 fine for the hazards employees encountered while on the job.

Epic Health has fifteen business days from receipt of the citations and proposed fine to comply, request a conference with OSHA’s area director, or contest the findings before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Advocate for Victims of Work-Related Sexual Assault

If you believe your employer is in violation of the law or your company’s code of ethics, call us immediately. Schedule a consultation by submitting an online contact form or calling 215-574-0600 to discuss your case with one of our Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green.

New Jersey Supreme Court Extends Take-Home Exposure Liability to Unrelated Individuals

By ,

The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on July 7, 2016 that companies can be held liable to their employees’ roommates or partners if those individuals are sickened by exposure to toxic substances carried home on workers’ bodies or clothing, known as a “take-home toxic-tort theory of liability.” Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., No. A-73-14 (N.J., July 6, 2016)

The New Jersey Supreme Court took up the question at the request of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is from 2012 and was originally filed in Pennsylvania state court, but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A woman named Brenda Schwartz brought suit against Accuratus Ceramic Corporation, a ceramics manufacturer that has a facility in Warren County, New Jersey. Accuratus manufactures and uses products containing beryllium, which can cause chronic beryllium disease, and lead to scarring of the lungs. Schwartz was diagnosed with the disease, and claimed it was due to exposure to her then-boyfriend, now-husband, and his roommate’s clothes. Both men worked at the facility.

The district court found that Accuratus had no duty to Schwartz under New Jersey law, because Schwartz was not the spouse of either man, distinguishing the case from a prior decision in which the New Jersey Supreme had extended duty in these kinds of cases to employees’ spouses. Schwartz appealed to the Third Circuit, and the Third Circuit asked the New Jersey Supreme Court for its views. The Court did not establish a bright-line rule, but stated that liability could be established on a case-by-case basis by analyzing a number of factors. Factors to be taken into account include the employee’s relationship to the exposed individual, the foreseeability of the individual’s exposure, and the toxicity of the substance in question.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Offer Exceptional Legal Guidance 

The Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green keep up-to-the-minute on employment issues that matter to our clients. To discuss your case, call 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Third Circuit Rehears Defamation Claim Involving Philadelphia Firefighter

By ,

On June 21, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reheard en banc a defamation and false light claim against the New York Daily News. The paper was sued by a Philadelphia firefighter whose photograph appeared with an article in January of 2016 about a sex scandal involving Philadelphia firefighters and a paramedic.

The Third Circuit affirmed a dismissal of the suit back in February after finding that Cheney could not show that the allegedly defamatory material in the article was capable of being reasonably understood as referring to him. The panel concluded that the article does not name Cheney in any way and that the caption on the picture makes it clear that it was a stock photograph meant to illustrate firefighters in general, not those involved in the scandal. The photograph of Cheney had the caption, “Philadelphia firefighter Francis Cheney holds a flag at a 9/11 ceremony in 2006.”

The attorney for Cheney argued during the rehearing that his client should get a second chance at suing the paper because Cheney only found out about the article after people who saw it contacted him and thought he was involved in the scandal. The attorney argued that therefore, a reasonable reader could in fact conclude the article is about Cheney.

During the rehearing, Judge Chagares raised concerns about the confusing and high standard for dismissing defamation cases, and stated, “We better be sure [there’s no possibility of defamation] before we render a final decision at this point. This is utterly incapable of a defamatory meaning?”

Cheney v. Daily News L.P., No. 15-2251, 2016 WL 456625 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2016)

Philadelphia Business Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Handle Defamation and Disparagement Litigation

Philadelphia business lawyers at the Law Offices of Sidkoff, Pincus & Green offer superior legal representation in cases involving defamation and disparagement. Call 215-574-0600 today to schedule a consultation or contact us online.

Philadelphia Wrongful Termination Lawyers: Doctor’s Case May Proceed

By ,

On February 24, 2016 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled to allow Plaintiff, Dr. Muhamad Aly Rifai, to move forward on his claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In Rifai v. CMS Medical Care Corporation, et al., Plaintiff alleges that Defendant CMS hired him in May 2011 for a three-year term of employment, which was subsequently renewed a year later. The employment contract provided that either Plaintiff or CMS could terminate the agreement by giving the other party at least 120 days’ notice of the intent to terminate, or CMS could terminate immediately for cause.

Plaintiff alleges that on January 2, 2013, Plaintiff was given 120 days’ notice that he would be terminated on May 7, 2013. However, Plaintiff alleged that only five days later he was terminated for cause, effective May 7, 2013. Plaintiff thereafter filed suit, claiming Defendants fired him due to his Syrian ethnic background, Islamic religious beliefs, and the perception that he was mentally disabled. The Eastern District ruled that Plaintiff plead sufficient facts to allege breach of contract and a claim under the ADA.

The Court ruled that it found “that plaintiff sets forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that defendants regarded him as having an impairment,” specifically noting how Rifai’s complaint explained that at the time of his termination, defendants told various employees Rifai suffered from a mental impairment and was mentally unstable, unable to safely perform his medical duties.

For more information, call Philadelphia wrongful termination lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Statue of Limitations for Bad Faith Claim

By ,

Statute of Limitations for Bad Faith Claim Triggers After Failure to Investigate Same Claim After Denial, When Insurer is Provided With New Information

In Rancosky v. Washington National Insurance Company, the Superior Court addressed the issue of whether the statute of limitations for bad faith claims restarts after an insurance company fails to investigate a claim after receiving new information. In Rancosky, the Court ruled that the insured’s bad faith claim fell within the two-year statute of limitations based upon poor investigative practices. .

The trial court effectively ruled that a bad faith plaintiff must establish the insurer had a motive of self-interest or ill will. While the trial court had ruled that self-interest or ill will were considered in weighing the first element, absence of a reasonable basis, the Superior Court found this was merely a back door ruling that self-interest or ill will were required elements to establish the claim. The Superior Court observed that “there is an important distinction between an initial act of alleged bad faith conduct and later independent and separate acts of such conduct.”  It ruled that: “When a plaintiff alleges a subsequent and separately actionable instance of bad faith, distinct from and unrelated to the initial denial of coverage, a new limitations period begins to run from the later act of bad faith.” Thus, “[a]n inadequate investigation is a separate and independent injury to the insured.”

For more information, call Philadelphia business lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Bad Faith Lawyers: Bad Faith Claim Denied After Court Finds No Coverage for Third Party Negligence

By ,

In Rogers v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of bad faith claims asserted against Allstate. Finding that the insured’s auto insurance comprehensive clause did not cover negligent or poor workmanship repairs by a third-party repair shop, the claim was dismissed.

The insured was involved in a collision, and permitted an unsolicited tow truck to transport her car to Collisionworks for repairs and she agreed to complete the repairs for the cost proposed in the adjuster’s estimate directly to Allstate, who then paid Collisionworks. After the car owner noticed issues with the vehicle, she filed a claim with Allstate for the car’s condition, which was denied by Allstate. Allstate claimed that the company does not provide comprehensive coverage for loss caused by negligent repairs.

After the denial the insured filed suit against Allstate and Collisionworks. The trial court sustained Allstate’s preliminary objections and dismissed the woman’s claims of breach of contract, negligence, violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and bad faith with prejudice. After reviewing the policy, the Court concluded that only certain categories of harm were subject to coverage, including: 1) weather-related risks, 2) Civil unrest risks, 3) Criminal Acts, and 4) falling objects. The Court stated that the insured’s claim, as pled, can only be characterized as faulty or negligent workmanship, and not a criminal act.

For more information, call Philadelphia bad faith lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: SEC Rule 144

By ,

Where a founder of a publicly traded company pledged unregistered, “control securities” to a bank to collateralize a personal loan, if the bank foreclosed on the control securities, would it be required to comply with  the Securities Exchange Commission’s Rule 144 (17 C.F.R. § 230.144)? [1]

  1. The facts of the transaction

In one of the cases handled by Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C.,  a client I will call “Mr. Founder,” retained forty percent of the shares of his company (“COMPANY”) when it had its initial public offering (“IPO”). As is customary, his shares were not registered with the SEC and were not part of the IPO, thus making them untradeable on the NASDAQ where the COMPANY was listed.  Mr. Founder then borrowed $50 million from a bank (“THE BANK”) and pledges his unregistered shares in the COMPANY as collateral for the loan. The loan documents stated that if the share price dropped below $5, the bank could seize the pledged shares. Due to a computerized trading glitch, the stock market crashed, and the shares of the COMPANY, which had always traded at over $10, had a brief few minutes where they (along with almost all other shares being traded the stock market that day) reached a new low when it’s shares traded at $4.25. Later in the day, the shares recovered somewhat, and closed at $7.12. When THE BANK sought to exercise its rights to foreclose on the collateral, Mr. Founder asked us to help. We began to negotiate a new loan with the loan specialist at THE BANK to replace the loan where it  had called in the collateral. One thing was evident: a new loan would need to avoid an automatic call of the collateral if there was a temporary drop in the price. In discussions, we learned that the THE BANK’s lawyers had convinced  it that a trigger price to call the collateral was needed because the shares were not tradeable because the lawyers were convinced the shares were restricted, and after THE BANK seized them, it would be required to comply with SEC Rule 144  (17 C.F.R. § 230.144).. We disagreed and presented the following argument in an effort to persuade the bank that once it obtained the shares, they would not be subject to Rule 144, and could be traded freely. Therefore, we argued, the trigger price was not necessary to protect THE BANK.

  1. Analysis of whether pledged shares are considered control shares after foreclosure

As adopted and interpreted by the Securities Exchange Commission, Rule 144 is concerned with the distribution of restricted securities, both in private companies and companies that have stock that is publicly traded. While the issue here is the application of Rule 144 to the COMPANY shares pledged to THE BANK, Rule 144 was actually designed to provide a method for a CEO of a public company who obtained his shares from a source other than buying them on a stock exchange or through a stockbroker (such as in an IPO) to sell their shares.[2]  The scheme of Rule 144 allows the CEO to sell his shares without being considered an “underwriter”, a term broadly defined by the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. Section 2(11)) to include one who “has purchased from an issuer [or from one who controls an issuer] with a view to … the distribution of any security” as well as one who “sells for an issuer [or for one who controls an issuer].” Id. at § 77b (11) (which generally means a person or entity involved in the market for a security and its distribution). Under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C., at § 77), an underwriter must comply with the requirement of registering the stock under the Securities Act of 1933, and essentially pursue an IPO or secondary offering. While Rule 144 generally treats an “issuer” (i.e., COMPANY) as if it were an underwriter, it provides a path for the issuer’s CEO to dribble out a small amount of the stock in the first six months (the “holding period” established under Rule 144(b) for listed companies). However, Rule 144 establishes hurdles and limitations on when, and how many shares can be sold; and also what kind of notice of the sale must be filed with the SEC to inform the public of the intended sale. Rule 144 focuses on the words “restricted security” and its definition is broad. For purposes of Rule 144, and as is pertinent here, an “affiliate” of an issuer is defined as “a person that directly, or indirectly controls the issuer.”

In the hypothetical sale (not the actual pledge situation), because the CEO is the founder and president of COMPANY, he would be deemed by Rule 144 to be an affiliate of COMPANY, and subject to Rule 144. (See, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144). Further, the shares that the CEO were deemed “control securities” (See the definition of “person” at § 230.144 (3) (a) (2).)[3]  In other words, using a hypothetical sale scenario for purposes of analyzing what the typical and anticipated Rule 144 case looks like, the CEO’s shares would be viewed as control securities.  If there had been no pledge of these shares to THE BANK, and if the CEO proposed to sell the shares, Rule 144 would oblige the CEO to file papers with the SEC, at a minimum, to comply with the public information and notice of sale requirements of Rule 144(c). That notice would state that the shares satisfied the holding period of Rule 144(b), and otherwise meet all of the other requirements of Rule 144 (i.e., COMPANY has filed its reports with the SEC, and trades robustly on NASDAQ). The shares could then be sold in accordance with volume requirements of Rule 144.

  1. Under the better legal authority, Rule 144 does not apply to the COMPANY shares pledged to THE BANK once they are seized

With these definitions and interpretations of the various SEC rules in mind, we now turn to the unique circumstances here that distinguish this case. The most critical fact in this case is that the shares have been pledged as collateral, not sold to THE BANK; and if THE BANK should have the need to foreclose on them and then resell them, THE BANK would not be an “affiliate” of COMPANY, and would not be subject to the SEC Rules. Furthermore, it would be almost impossible for THE BANK to attempt to obtain approval under Rule 144 for the sale of the COMPANY shares when it took the collateral, before there was a default, and to also satisfy Rule 144(i) since it would require that THE BANK have a bona fide intention to sell within a reasonable time. The awkwardness demonstrates why THE BANK would not be deemed reasonably to be subject to Rule 144.

Hence, on its face, THE BANK, by accepting as collateral, shares in COMPANY, does not fit the definition of “underwriter” as set forth in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. which defines “underwriter” broadly to include one who “has purchased from an issuer [or from one who controls an issuer] with a view to … the distribution of any security” as well as one who “sells for an issuer [or for one who controls an issuer].” Id. at § 77b(11) (Emphasis added). Section 4 of the Act creates a number of exemptions from this general rule. Id. § 77d. The exemption in Section 4(1) exempts “transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.” Id. § 77d(1).  As noted, an underwriter is defined in relevant part in Section 2(a)(11) as “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking.” Id. § 77b(a)(11). For purposes of the underwriter definition only, an issuer includes any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the issuer of the securities. Id. In light of the purpose of the Act, exemptions generally are to be interpreted to promote full disclosure of information necessary to protect the investing public. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953). None of these factors or the reasoning, applies to THE BANK, which had no interest in purchasing COMPANY shares from COMPANY to help sell the shares in connection with the distribution of the shares.

There is considerable legal support holding that a pledgee such as THE BANK, that took a pledge of restricted shares as collateral for a loan, and might have to sell that collateral at a foreclosure sale, would not be an underwriter. A.D.M. Corp. v. Thompson, 707 F.2d 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1983).  In A.D.M., the Court held that the bank had a direct and separate economic interest in the restricted, control shares from the interest of the borrowers; and that it was not an underwriter since it did not directly or indirectly participate in the distribution of the asset. See, Rule 144(d)(3)(iv) and (e)(3)(ii); SEC Release No. 33–6099 (August 2, 1979), Q.49 (SEC treated estate as separate from its beneficiaries for purposes of determining the volume limitation).  While recognizing a contrary view in the dicta of SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1950), the Court was persuaded by the criticism of the position taken there, citing Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) as well as the leading experts whose treatises on securities law was then, and still is, found by courts to be persuasive: 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 645-51 (2d ed. 1961); 11 H. Sowards, Business Organizations, § 4.01[3][b] & [c]. See, also, Getz v. Cent. Bank of Greencastle, 147 Ind. App. 356 (1970).

It likewise has been the position of the SEC for many years that a bank in the shoes of THE BANK is not obliged to comply with the requirements of filing a prospectus or obtaining an exemption under Rule 144 when accepting unregistered or controlled shares as collateral for a loan; and there are numerous SEC staff, “no-action letters” declining to bring enforcement actions in scenarios where banks and creditors took as collateral unregistered securities, and then sought to seize and sell the shares but were not considered to be underwriters. See, Russell Ranch, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 476256 (Aug. 11, 1995); Angelo K. Tsakopoulos, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 31695 (Feb. 5, 1993); Sec. Pac. Bank Ariz., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 159159 (June 26, 1992); Albuquerque Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108519 (Oct. 26, 1987); Harbor Properties Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28691 (Sept. 22, 1983); In the Matter of Otc Live, Inc. & Mark A. Suleymanov, SEC No-Action Letter, Release No. 261 (Sept. 30, 2004).

In each of these cases, a bank or other creditor sought to seize unregistered or otherwise restricted shares and to then resell the shares to satisfy the debt for which the shares provided security. In each case the Court or the SEC found that a creditor does not fit the definition of an “underwriter” on the one hand, and on the other, there was no policy gain to distort the language of the SEC Rules to transform the creditor into an underwriter. The gist of these holdings and SEC-No Action Letters was that the banks, accepted the unregistered, restricted stock as collateral for loans. If a bank foreclosed on the collateral, it seeks to mitigate its loss on the loan through sale of the collateral.  The bank never intended to participate in a public distribution of unregistered securities, thus differentiating a bank from an underwriter.

Accordingly, when we presented the weight of the authority and our view that it compelled the conclusion that the COMPANY shares pledged by the FLP would not be Rule 144 shares (as that term is commonly used) if they were seized, loan was renegotiated with terms that were favorable to our client.

For more information, call our Philadelphia business lawyers at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.


 

[1] Researched and written by Gary Green, Esquire, who is the Managing Partner of Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C.. This was copyrighted on January 26, 2016 by the author.

[2] Obviously, Rule 144 applies to owners of shares in addition to those who are the CEO of an issuer; but because the CEO’s issue was what we dealt with, we will use his status in this discussion for the sake of clarity.

[3] Although it is not a term defined in Rule 144, “control securities” is used commonly to refer to securities held by an affiliate of the issue regardless of how the affiliate acquired the securities. See, REVISIONS TO RULES 144 AND 145 Release No. 8869 FILE S7-11-07 December 6, 2007.

 

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers: Liability for Temp Employees

By ,

A recent Third Circuit decision overhauled previous notions of non-liability for temporary employees.  Typically, a temporary employee is thought to be the liability problem of the staffing agency that places the employee. The Third Circuit’s decision in Faush v Tuesday Morning, Inc. suggests otherwise. In this case, Plaintiff Matthew Faush and two other employees were ordered to clean up trash in the back of the store. When Faust complained about the assignment he was told by the store manager that minorities were not allowed to work in the front due to risk of theft. Faust was then fired shortly after. The district court decided that Faust was not an employer and could not be liable under the discrimination statutes.

The Third Circuit Court examined the factors and ruled that the company was liable for its temporary workers because it: indirectly paid Faush’s wages, had the power to demand replacement workers, gave assignments, and directly supervised the temporary workers.  Individuals employed by third party staffing firms may have a relationship not only with the staffing agency, but with employers as well, and that relationship should be closely examined when dealing with incidents involving liability. Individuals employed by staffing agencies should carefully review their contracts to ensure that such agreements provide adequate protection against potential adverse actions taken by the employer.

For more information, call Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Trial Lawyers: Proposed Civil Asset Forteiture Ban

By ,

Proposal to Ban Civil Asset Forfeiture to Come Before Pennsylvania State Senate Committee

In July of 2015, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a bill requiring prosecutors to convict an individual of a crime before the State could take his/her property permanently through civil forfeiture. Civil asset forfeiture is used by police and prosecutors to take property from individuals suspected of a crime. Previously, this meant that the state could take property from an individual, even if that individual had never been convicted. Types of forfeitable property include cash, cars, homes, and other personal property.

Sentiment has been moving away from Pennsylvania’s use of civil forfeiture. In November of 2012, Judge Dan Pellegrini of Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court stated that Pennsylvania’s civil asset forfeiture law amounted to “little more than state-sanctioned theft.”

The Philadelphia Trial Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Individuals Suspected of a Crime

If you or a family member is suspected of a crime and need experienced legal representation the Philadelphia Trial Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green can help.  For more information contact us online, or call 215-574-0600.