Philadelphia Court Refuses to Enforce Arbitration Provision

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On April 3, 2017, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas refused to uphold an arbitration provision in a Responsible Person Agreement (“RPA”) signed by a nursing home resident’s daughter, but not signed by the resident herself. Clementson v. Evangelical Manor, Civil Action No. 160601775 (C.P. Philadelphia 2017). On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff, Elsie Clementson, was a resident of Defendant Evangelical Manor’s nursing home when she suffered a serious fall, resulting in a tibia fracture. When Plaintiff was admitted to the nursing home in 2012, Plaintiff’s daughter signed an RPA, which stated that the person signing the agreement may be “the Guardian, the Agent under a Power of Attorney, or any person authorized by the Resident to serve as Resident’s Responsible Person.” The RPA also contained a mandatory arbitration provision. At the time the RPA was signed, Plaintiff’s daughter did not have power of attorney over her mother, nor was she authorized by her mother to serve as her mother’s “Responsible Person.”

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on June 17, 2016. On November 3, 2016, Defendant filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration. On December 19, 2016, the Court denied Defendant’s Petition, which it timely appealed. On appeal, the Court upheld the decision to deny Defendant’s Petition, as Pennsylvania law does not allow an agent, by his own words, to invest himself with apparent authority, as such authority has to derive from the action of the principal, not the agent. The Court ruled that Defendant failed to provide any evidence that Plaintiff was present at the time that her daughter signed the RPA, or that her daughter could sign for her. Defendant also failed to offer any evidence of actions taken by Plaintiff that would create an agency relationship.

For more information, call our business lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

Overtime and the Fluctuating Workweek Method

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Calculating Overtime Using the Fluctuating Workweek Method Does Not Violate the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently resolved a case regarding the method of calculating overtime compensation under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA). In Chevalier v. Gen. Nutrition Centers, Inc., 177 A.3d 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) employees filed a class action against General Nutritional Centers (GNC) for unpaid overtime, specifically that GNC’s method of calculating overtime violated the PMWA. The PMWA provides that employees must be paid overtime at not less than 1½ times their regular rate for every hour worked over 40 in a workweek.

GNC calculated overtime compensation using the fluctuating workweek method (FWW). The FWW determines an employee’s “regular rate” of compensation for the workweek by dividing each employee’s pay by the number of hours the employee worked during the workweek. Therefore, employees’ regular rates fluctuated each week. GNC then paid employees at one-half of their regular rate for each hour of overtime worked. The employees argued that, (1) an employee’s regular rate should have been calculated using a fixed 40-hour workweek, not the fluctuating workweek method, and (2) the overtime pay should have been 1½ times their regular rate for each hour of overtime instead of one-half their regular rate

The Superior Court found that using the FWW to calculate an employee’s regular rate did not violate the PMWA, however, paying overtime of only one-half the regular rate did violate the PMWA. In support of the FWW not violating the PMWA the court mentioned that the Pennsylvania Generally Assembly borrowed the term “regular rate” from the Fair Labor Standards Act, which permitted the FWW method of calculation when the PMWA was enacted. In support of paying overtime of one-half the regular rate violating the PMWA the court cited a Pennsylvania regulation requiring employers to pay employees not less than 1½ times their regular rate of pay for all hours exceeding the 40 hours threshold. In conclusion, the FWW is permissible under the PMWA, however overtime must still be paid at 1½ times the employee’s regular rate.

For more information, call our overtime lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Discharged Predecessor Law Firm Can Collect Fees from Succeeding Firm in Wrongful Death Action

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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ruled that predecessor law firms who are discharged by a client can recover damages in quantum meruit from a successor law firm that takes over the case. In Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2016), the case involved a dispute between two law firms about attorney’s fees earned in a wrongful death litigation settlement. Plaintiff, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck law firm, (“Meyer”) brought a breach of contract and quantum meruit action against Defendant, Law Firm of Malone Middleman (“Middleman”).

In the case, an attorney named William Weiler, Jr. formally represented the Eazor estate in March 2005. Later that year, Weiler became associated with Meyer, and entered into a written employment agreement acknowledging that “any and all legal work performed by him will be deemed work on behalf of the firm.” Weiler brought to the firm the Eazor estate litigation, and along with other Meyer attorneys and staff, worked on the case over the course of 19 months. 2 years later, Weiler resigned from Meyer and agreed Meyer would receive two-thirds of attorney’s fees arising from the Eazor estate litigation. Weiler then subsequently became affiliated with Middleman. The Eazor estate discharged Meyer, and entered into a contingency fee agreement with Middleman without addressing payment or protection of attorney’s fees to Meyer. Middleman ultimately obtained settlement for the Eazor estate. Meyer filed this action claiming entitlement to two-thirds of attorney’s fees.

The court ruled that Meyer could not recover under a breach of contract claim because Middleman, as the successor firm, was not bound by the predecessor firm’s employment agreement with Weiler. However, Meyer was not deprived of its right to recover under quantum meruit the proper amount for the services which they had rendered for the litigation.

For more information, call our Philadelphia business lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

Pennsylvania Employee Terminated for Legitimate Reasons Despite Claims of Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation

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On February 13, 2018, a jury found in favor of a defendant employer against a plaintiff alleging hostile work environment and retaliation. In Johnson v. Keystone Quality Transp. Co., Johnson, a former employee of Keystone working as a paratransit van driver, alleged hostile work environment and retaliation after she was terminated. No. 2:16-cv-06603-GJP. Johnson alleged claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et. seq. (“Title VII”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951, et. seq. (“PHRA”).

According to the Complaint, while working at Keystone, Johnson’s supervisor began sexually harassing and assaulting her, including sending inappropriate pictures of himself and groping her more than once. Once Johnson reported the harassment, the supervisor was terminated by Keystone for his actions. However, about a week later, Plaintiff was suspended and ultimately fired. In her suit, Johnson alleged she was terminated in retaliation for reporting the harassment.

Keystone successfully rebutted Johnson’s claims by proving that Johnson’s suspension was a result of taking the wrong vehicle and preventing the use of another vehicle as she had the set of car keys on her. Keystone argued that after the suspension was over, Johnson was not terminated, but rather she abandoned her job, as she failed to come back to work. Weighing the facts of the case, a jury determined there was no sexual harassment or retaliation by Keystone against Johnson.

For more information, call our Philadelphia employment lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

Sixth Circuit Rules Discrimination Against Transgender/LGBTQ Employees Violates Title VII

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On Wednesday, March 6, 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that discrimination against transgender/LGBTQ employees is discrimination based on sex, a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the employee, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. 2018 WL 1177669, at *1 (C.A.6 (Mich.), 2018). The employee was terminated soon after informing the owner of the funeral home that she planned to transition and would represent herself as a woman. After receiving the employee’s complaint, the EEOC investigated the allegations of sex discrimination and learned in addition that the funeral home had in place a discriminatory clothing policy, providing males with clothing adhering with the dress codes, while woman received no such benefit. The EEOC filed suit on behalf of the employee, alleging violations of Title VII based on the termination of the employee and the discriminatory clothing policy.

The Sixth Circuit ultimately found in favor of the EEOC on the unlawful discrimination claim, holding that firing an employee “because of their failure to conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII.” Furthermore, the Court determined that the funeral home could not use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as a defense because there would be no substantial burden to their religious exercise by continuing to employ the individual.

For more information, call our employment lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

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Pennsylvania Property Case Heads to the Supreme Court

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On March 5, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a Petition for Writ of Certiori to review Knick v. Scott Township, a Pennsylvania case addressing the procedure a property owner whose land was taken by the government under the 5th Amendment must follow prior to filing in federal court, and determine whether it should reconsider its holding in Willamson County Regional Planning Com’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In Williamson, the Supreme Court ruled that a property owner filing a claim against the government for taking property without just compensation cannot file a case in federal court until he or she has first gotten a “final decision” from the appropriate state or local regulatory agency and has “exhausted” all possible remedies in state court.

In Knick, Plaintiff Rose Mary Knick lives on 90 acres of land in rural Pennsylvania. In 2012, the town in which Knick’s property is located passed an ordinance requiring all owners of cemeteries to provide public access to those sites during daylight hours. The town alleged that this ordinance applied to a private cemetery it contended was on Knick’s land. Although Knick sued the township in state court, the court declined to rule because the town had withdrawn its notice of violation and agreed not to enforce the ordinance against her. Knick next appealed in federal court, but the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed her claims for failure to exhaust all of her remedies in state court. On appeal, the 3rd Circuit ruled in favor of the Township.

For more information, call our business lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

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Third Circuit Holds that Employee’s Anti-Vaccination Beliefs were not Religious

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently affirmed the opinion of the District Court that a medical center employee’s anti-vaccination beliefs were not religious in nature. The employee had been terminated for refusing to be vaccinated against the flu and claimed that his termination constituted religious discrimination. His case was dismissed by the District Court. The Court found that although his beliefs were sincere, they were not religious in nature and not protected by Title VII.  This determination was affirmed by the Third Circuit.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Under Title VII, it is unlawful to terminate an employee because of their religion as all adverse employment action based on a person’s religious affiliation is prohibited by the Act. Under the statute, religion encompasses belief, unless an employer can show that they are unable to reasonably accommodate their observance without undue hardship.

The legal standard, with respect to the employee’s personally held beliefs, is whether they addressed the fundamental questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters, and whether they are comprehensive in nature and accompanied by certain formal and external signs. When discussing his own beliefs, the employee in this case stated that one should not harm their own body, that he believed the flu vaccine did more harm than good, and that bowing to the medical center’s policy would violate his conscience as to what he believed was right and wrong. Because his beliefs did not meet the threshold set by the standard, the Court ultimately found that his beliefs were not religious. The Court noted that anti-vaccination beliefs could be part of a broader religious faith, in which case, refusal might be protected.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Represent Victims of Religious Discrimination

If you suspect that you have suffered an adverse employment action because of your religious beliefs, the Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. may be able help. To discuss your case, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online. Our legal team handles all types of employment related litigation.

Court Rules Massage Therapy can be Covered by Workers’ Compensation

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Many workers who have been injured on the job could benefit from massage therapy, depending on the nature of their condition. Passive modalities like massage therapy can save insurance companies extensive costs associated with more invasive treatment. However, many carriers view massages as an unnecessary luxury and not a proper medical treatment. Recently, the Commonwealth Court ruled that massage therapy can be covered under certain conditions.

Massage therapy has been shown to promote healing by stretching damaged tissues, reducing inflammation, and breaking down muscle adhesions. These can aid in the healing process. In the State of Pennsylvania, massage therapy has not been recognized as a covered medical treatment.

Schriver v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

However, in late 2017, the Court provided a roadmap as to how injured workers could be reimbursed for expenses accrued for massage therapy.   In the case of Schriver v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, an employee injured his back while working at the Department of Transportation.  The injury occurred nearly 40 years ago, in 1978. Since the accident, he had been receiving treatment from a general practitioner and a chiropractor.  The chiropractor referred the patient to massage therapy sessions once a month, priced at $60 per session, which the claimant paid himself.

Eventually, the injured worker sought reimbursement for the massage therapy, which was denied. He subsequently filed a petition, which culminated in two hearings.  A judge ultimately directed the employer to reimburse the claimant, but the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision, and the claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

He argued to the Court that his treatment was related to the work injury, and his licensed chiropractor had referred him for the treatment. The act mandates payment for services by a health care provider. This term has been defined to include individuals licensed by the commonwealth to provide health care services, or their agents.

Moran v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

The court then ran through an extensive analysis of case law to illuminate the issue. In one prior case, the Court held that vocational experts are not licensed, therefore referrals to those practitioners should not be reimbursed by the employer. Another case set forth that massages should not be reimbursed when performed by an unlicensed masseur, even with a prescription. However, in the case of Moran v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the court ruled that massages could be covered when performed by a licensed nurse, as they are considered a health care provider under the terms of the act.

In Pennsylvania, the legislature passed the Massage Therapy Law in 2008.  This law provided licensure for massage therapists, but specifically states that a license does not automatically render treatment reimbursable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. In the case at bar, the claimant’s massage therapy was directed by his chiropractor, and the masseur was licensed.  On these grounds, the Commonwealth Court found that the employer was liable for reimbursing the injured employee.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Handle all Types of Employment-Related Claims and Appeals

The experienced Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. are available to answer questions about your case. To learn more about how we can help, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online. Our offices are centrally located in Philadelphia, and we serve clients throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Court Dismisses False Claims Against CVS

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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the decision to dismiss a whistleblower action against CVS Caremark. The Court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that CVS knew Medicare Part D sponsors were intentionally submitting false information about costs to Medicare and Medicaid.

Anthony R. Spay is a former pharmacist who co-founded a company that audits pharmacies. In the whistleblower action, Spay alleged that Medicare Part D sponsors intentionally submitted false information about costs to the government during the reconciliation process. Specifically, Spay says these sponsors populated prescriber ID records with falsified IDs, which they claimed were used to replace ID data that was entered in error.  According to Spay, as a result of these falsified submissions, the government paid these sponsors more than they were entitled to.

A panel of three appellate judges ruled that the government was aware of the industry practice of using falsified IDs, yet paid the claims and never sought repayment from CVS Caremark. According to Third Circuit Judge Theodore McKee’s opinion, CVS could not be held liable for making false claims because Medicare and Medicaid were aware of the practice. Medicare Part D sponsors are companies that sell prescription plans and enter into subcontracts with pharmacies like CVS.

The Court’s decision was expressly informed by the government knowledge inference doctrine. Pursuant to this doctrine, if the government knows about the alleged misconduct, then it is already aware of the false claims and does not need assistance from private whistleblowers to identify them.  Although the Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, it disagreed with the trial court on its interpretation of that doctrine as applied to the facts at bar. The Third Circuit itself discussed the issue in depth in 1999, stating in Cantekin v. University of Pittsburgh that if the government was aware of the alleged false claims yet took no action, then any private suit was likely motivated by the sizable damages award promised to whistleblowers under the law.

However, the Third Circuit found that the doctrine was inapplicable here because CVS was unaware that the government knew about the false claims. The Court found that there was no evidence of tacit approval from the government to CVS Caremark of the stopgap industry practice.

Philadelphia Whistleblower Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Provide Confidential Consultations to Whistleblowers

If you have knowledge of false claims being submitted to the government, schedule a consultation with the Philadelphia whistleblower lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. today. Our legal team represents clients in qui tam actions and whistleblower claims under the False Claims Act in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online to schedule a confidential consultation.

Hearst Corporation in Unpaid Intern Lawsuit

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Approximately five years after interns filed a lawsuit against Hearst Corporation, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the company did not systematically exploit interns by having them perform entry-level work without pay. The interns claimed that Hearst Corp. violated federal and state law when it declined to pay thousands of interns.

Internship vs Entry-Level

The lead plaintiff, Xuedan Wang, alleged that 3,000 interns at Hearst’s numerous publications, including Elle, Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan, and Seventeen magazines, were exploited in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York state laws. The FLSA and state laws set forth specific requirements for internships, which distinguish them from entry-level jobs. To be exempt from the minimum wage requirements, employers must ensure that internships benefit the interns, among other things.

According to Second Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs, the question before the Court was whether Hearst Corp. offers bona fide for-credit internships, or whether it relied on student labor to avoid compensating entry-level employees. The key case that speaks to the legal standard is Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. In this case, the Court considered whether the intern or their employer was the primary beneficiary of the relationship. If the employer is the primary beneficiary, it cannot be deemed an internship, and is subject to the minimum wage requirements set forth under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In the Hearst Corp. case, Judge Jacobs found that Hearst made it clear to the interns that they would not be paid, and that the internships provided training similar to those provided in an educational environment. The students were also told that the internships were tied to a formal education program.

Distinguishing the Difference

The plaintiffs argued that internships should not include menial and repetitive tasks, with little supervision or guidance.  These, according to the plaintiffs, were tasks more likened to employment than an educational internship. However, the Judge found that many useful internships are designed to correct the impression that work is just as rewarding and fulfilling as school. Repeating administrative and organizational tasks, she ruled, can provide useful skills such as how to be more organized and focused in a professional setting. Plaintiffs can still appeal this ongoing ruling to the United States Supreme Court.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Represent Victims of FLSA Violations

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C., we handle all types of employment litigation, including claims that an employer has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, or local laws, by failing to pay overtime, meet minimum wage requirements, and more. To learn more about how we can help you and to schedule a confidential consultation, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online. We represent clients in employment litigation in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.