Eastern District of PA Upholds Employment Claim Release in Severance Agreement

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On May 9, 2018 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment against an employee who brought race and age discrimination claims against her former employer after she signed a release of claims in her severance agreement. Warren v. Mastery Charter Sch., No. CV 17-4782, 2018 WL 2129505, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2018). Plaintiff was a social worker in her forties with a master’s degree who worked for Mastery Charter Schools from 2011 through 2016. Her contracts with her employer were year to year and were typically renewed at the end of each year. In spite of consistently positive performance reviews over her first several years working for her employer, at the end of the 2016 school year Mastery chose not to renew Plaintiff’s contract based on allegations of poor performance and communication issues. The day before Plaintiff’s final day of work, Mastery offered her a severance agreement which also contained a release and waiver of any and all employment claims for her to review. The agreement offered significant benefits—including four weeks of additional pay—that it would otherwise not have been available to Plaintiff. Further Plaintiff was offered twenty one days to review and consider the offer, as well as the opportunity to revoke the agreement within seven days if she so chose. The agreement suggested in three different locations that Plaintiff consult with an attorney about the terms and frequently used bold lettering to indicate that the agreement should be carefully read.

Plaintiff alleged that her deteriorating relationship with Mastery had caused her significant stress, depression, and anxiety. Plaintiff alleged that her growing emotional distress caused her to fear if she did not accept the agreement that Mastery would seek to interfere and prevent her future employment elsewhere. Plaintiff signed the agreement on the twenty first day, claiming she felt she had no choice but to sign. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against Mastery for employment discrimination based on age and race on October 25, 2017.

The Court relied on the rule that an employee may release employment discrimination claims against an employer so long as the release is made “knowingly and willfully.” Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court relied on precedent to establish that although the Plaintiff may have been undergoing stress it did not negate her knowing and willful agreement to the release and waiver. Further the Court found that the agreement itself was written in a manner calculated to be understood and was sufficiently clear for the Plaintiff to understand what she was agreeing to in signing the release. The Court held that the presence of some legal jargon and long sentences was not sufficient basis to claim the release was not in a manner calculated to be understood. The Court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Mastery and upheld the validity of the release.

For more information, call our Philadelphia employment lawyers at the Law Offices of Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

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PA Court Continues Trend of Expanding the Definition of Work Premises

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On February 22, 2018 the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the growing practice of expanding the boundaries of work premises in order to protect employees injured on the job. US Airways, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bockelman), 179 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018), reargument denied (Mar. 28, 2018). A Philadelphia flight attendant working for US Airways, Inc. suffered significant knee and leg injuries while attempting to move her suitcase onto the luggage racks of the shuttle bus that transports employees from a separate parking facility to the workplace of her employer. US Airways did not own, rent, or lease the shuttle buses, and did not require use of the shuttle or provide any directive at all to employees as to how employees should commute to work. The attendant brought a claim seeking compensation to cover the medical expenses for her injuries. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found that the employee was injured in the course and scope of her employment, US Airways appealed.

On appeal US Airways challenged the argument that the shuttle was part of the protected premises for employees. The Court emphasized that the term “premises” in the scope of the workplace was not limited solely to property actually owned or leased by the employer. The Court relied on precedent to establish that “premises includes reasonable means of access to the workplace” and that “means of access customarily used by employees” may be considered within the scope of employer’s premises. US Airways understood that employees who drove to work would almost always be required to park in the separate parking facility and use the shuttle system. The court found that the use of the shuttle system was “a necessary part of her employment.” Even if US Airways did not explicitly require its employees to use the shuttle, it was so integral, connected, and expected for employment that the WCJ did not err in concluding that the shuttle was required by nature of the employment. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s order was affirmed, and rearguement was denied on March 28, 2018.

For more information, call our Philadelphia employment lawyers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

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District Court of the Eastern District PA Rules in Favor of Former Employee in Non-Compete Dispute.

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The District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Catalyst Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. Douglas denied the plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 2018 BL 184866 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2018, No. 18-1470). Jennifer Douglas (Douglas) is a former employee of Catalyst Outdoor Advertising, LLC (Catalyst) and has recently located to New York City to work for City Outdoor, LLC (Outdoor). Before being terminated by Catalyst, Douglas signed a non-compete and restrictive covenant agreement which prevented her from engaging “in the same or similar business” as Catalyst for two years. Neither agreement included a specified geographic limitation and therefore, could be applied to the entire world. Catalyst engages in outdoor advertising, mainly by acquiring and renting billboards in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. One month after Catalyst terminated Douglas, she accepted a position for Outdoor. Outdoor is located in New York City and specializes in the billboard advertising business primarily in the New York.

Catalyst brought a suit seeking preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin Douglas from continuing her employment at Outdoor. When deciding on whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate the Court considered four factors: 1. The likelihood that catalyst will succeed on the merits; 2. The threat of irreparable harm to Catalyst if an injunction is not granted; 3. Whether granting an injunction will result in greater harm to Douglas than Catalyst; and 4. Whether injunctive relief will be in the public interest.. The Court rejected Catalyst’s motion based on its failure to satisfy the first two factors.

Catalyst argued that Douglas should be enjoined from her employment with Outdoor because the restrictive covenant was reasonably necessary for their protection of legitimate business interests. The legitimate business interest in this matter, according to Catalysts, was the preservation of trade secrets, development plans, and pricing. Additionally, Catalyst argued that the two employers shared a common competitive market and therefore the lack of a geographic limitation should not prevent preliminary injunction because Outdoor is involved in the same market.

The Court accepted Catalyst’s argument that there was a legitimate business interest to protect but rejected the argument that Outdoor and Catalysts shared the same competitive market, and thus, denied Catalysts motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Without a specified geographic, the court determined that the two companies’ respective markets will determine if they are, in fact, “competing.” Since Catalyst primarily operated in Philadelphia while Outdoor focused in Manhattan and the Bronx, the court determined that these were, in fact, two separate markets and that these two companies were not competing. Thus, the court found that Catalyst failed to satisfy the first factor required to win a preliminary injunction.

Lastly, the Court held that Catalyst did not face the risk of any irreparable harm. The fact that Douglas did not have any confidential information and because of the entirely different markets, there was no threat of irreparable harm. Without the two companies engaging in the same competitive market, Catalyst was not able to establish a legitimate harm. Therefore, the Court rejected the motion for preliminary injunctive relief and Ms. Douglas may continue her employment until a decision is reached at trial.

For more information, call Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online. Our non-compete lawyers represent clients in Philadelphia.

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Third Circuit Strikes Down Philadelphia Trademark Claim

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In July 2017, the Third Circuit ruled against Appellant Parks, LLC (“Parks”) in its false association trademark claim against Tyson Foods, Inc. and Hillshire Brands Company (collectively “Tyson”). Parks, LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2017). Parks manufactured sausage under the brand name “Parks,” taken from the founder’s surname, from the 1950s until 2000 when it entered into a licensing agreement with Dietz and Watson, a Philadelphia based producer of delicatessen meats. Dietz and Watson, as well as Super Bakery, Inc., has continued to make and sell Parks branded products since partnering in 2000. In 2014, Tyson introduced a line of frankfurters under their trademarked “Ball Park” line called “Park’s Finest.” In 2015, Parks filed suit against Tyson for false association, among other claims, in the District Court. The trial court granted Tyson’s motion for summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed.

To make a successful false association claim, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) the marks are owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant’s use of the marks to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of the goods or services.” A mark can be valid and legally protectable if it is either inherently distinctive or achieves secondary meaning. Since trademarks based on a surname are not inherently distinctive, Parks argued that “Parks” has a secondary meaning which occurs when “the mark is interpreted by the consuming public to be not only an identification of the product or services, but also a representation of the origin of those products or services.” In order to evaluate if “Parks” has a second meaning, the Court examined factors including the extent of advertising, length and exclusivity of use, evidence of copying, customer surveys, size of the company and number of sales and customers, and actual confusion.

While Parks could show that it had a long history and exclusivity of use of “Parks,” considering its nearly 60-year history of using the mark, it was unable to prove the other factors. First, Parks could not show that there was recent evidence of extensive advertising sufficient to create a mental association between the mark and the product because their product was merely advertised locally. Second, Parks could not prove that Tyson purposefully copied the “Parks” brand. Third, Parks was unable to show that there was brand confusion using a Squirt survey, in which participants are asked questions about the products in the claim alongside control products to see if there is confusion. Here, the survey did show consumer confusion; however, the Court rejected the results as the participants were primed to find these products to be similar amongst the varied control products. Finally, Parks’ minimal sales compared to Tyson’s large presence in the national market lends to the conclusion that “Parks” did not have a second meaning because people more likely associate the mark with the larger Tyson and historically have not actually confused the two brands as evidenced through extensive discovery.

Even though the Court recognized Parks’ long history and exclusivity of the “Parks” mark, it found that Parks’ false association claim could not continue in the face of its lack of advertising, its “miniscule market share,” and its lack of brand confusion.

For more information, please call our Philadelphia Trademark Lawyers at Sidkoff Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

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Eastern District PA Court Finds Sites Reviewing Products are not Engaged in Commercial Speech

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On May 4, 2018 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that certain websites that engage exclusively in reviewing consumer goods are not engaged in “commercial speech” and are not in violation of trademark law. GOLO, LLC v. HighYa, LLC, No. CV 17-2714, 2018 WL 2086733, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2018). Plaintiff GOLO owns and operates a weight loss program which had been reviewed on both Defendants, HighYa and BrightReviews, websites. Plaintiff alleged that the reviews posted by Defendants and consumers on their sites were fraudulent and harmed its business. Neither Defendant sells any goods from their sites and both derive most, if not all, of their revenue from web traffic and advertisements on their sites. Plaintiff brought a claim for false advertising and trademark infringement under the Lanham Act as well as state law libel and unfair competition claims.

The Eastern District dismissed Plaintiff’s claims based upon the fact that Defendants did not engage in commercial speech. The court explained that to sustain a claim under the Lanham Act regarding issues of false advertising or false association it is required that such speech made be commercial. To identify if speech is commercial a court must decide “whether the speech (i) is an advertisement, (ii) refers to a specific product or service, and (iii) whether the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.” Id. The main dispute was whether prongs (i) and (iii) were met by way of Defendants’ online reviews. Relying on a decision in the Eleventh Circuit, the Court reasoned that although Defendants were economically benefitted by consumers trafficking their sites and reviews, “the financial benefit is merely incidental to the content of the reviews.” Defendants did not directly make recommendations regarding Plaintiff’s program. Further Plaintiff could not cite to specific evidence of how Defendants’ reviews directly and negatively harmed business.

The Court went on to dismiss the trademark infringement or false association claim on the grounds that Plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ use of Plaintiff’s name was “likely to cause consumer confusion.” The trade libel claim and unfair competition claims were dismissed due to such claims being time-barred and Plaintiff inadequately pleading falsity. The Motion to Dismiss on behalf of both Defendants was granted.

For more information, please call our Philadelphia trademark lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

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Third Circuit Affirms Denial of Injunction Blocking Transgender Bathroom Policy

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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction that would prohibit a school district from continuing its practice of allowing transgender students to use the bathroom and locker rooms of the sex by which they identify. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., No. 17-3113, 2018 WL 2355999, at *1 (3d Cir. May 24, 2018). The claim was brought by parents of several cisgender students who claimed that such policy of the Boyertown Area School District violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, their right to access to educational opportunities, programs, and benefits, and their Pennsylvania common law right to privacy preventing intrusion while using bathrooms and locker rooms. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d, No. 17-3113, 2018 WL 2355999 (3d Cir. May 24, 2018). The policy had been implemented since the beginning of the 2016-17 academic year, the plaintiffs sought the school district return to the prior policy requiring students to use any private facilities associated with their biological sex assigned at birth.

After reviewing the testimony of the students whose parents brought the complaint, testimony from a transgender student at the Boyertown Area Senior High School, and testimony from Dr. Scott Leibowitz, an expert in gender dysphoria and gender identity issues in children and adolescents, the trial court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiff students “did not have a constitutional right not to share restrooms or locker rooms with transgender students whose sex assigned at birth is different than theirs.” Much of the emphasis by the court was predicated on the fact that the plaintiffs, if they were uncomfortable sharing private facilities under the policy, could have used private stalls or an alternative facility like the nurse’s office.

The plaintiffs failed to meet the “particularly heavy burden” of showing they were entitled to the preliminary injunction as they did not seek a return to the status quo but a change in a policy that stood for a year.  Further the plaintiffs had not sufficiently shown that they were likely to suffer “irreparable injury” if the injunction was not issued as the policy had been around for almost a year when they filed their complaint. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction “for the reasons that the Court explained in its exceptionally well reasoned Opinion”. Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., No. 17-3113, 2018 WL 2355999, at *1 (3d Cir. May 24, 2018).

For more information, call our employment lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

PA Supreme Court Upholds Non-Economic Damages for Whistleblowers

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Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that wrongfully terminated whistleblowers can recover non-economic damages. Bailets v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n., 2018 Pa. LEXIS 1498 (2018). Bailets centered around a whistleblower claim made by a manager of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (PTC) alleging that they fired him in retaliation for reporting wrongdoings and waste to his supervisors. The lower court found in Plaintiff’s favor and awarded economic and noneconomic damages totaling over $3 million. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and award of economic and non-economic damages.

This issue centered on whether the term “actual damages” in Section 125 of the Whistleblower Law should be narrowly or broadly interpreted to include non-economic damages. PTC argued that actual damages refer solely to economic damages because allowance of non-economic damages would be analogous to punitive damages. PTC also argued that exceptions to the Commonwealth’s immunity should be narrowly interpreted and thus non-economic damages should not be read into “actual damages.” The employee argued that actual damages include non-economic damages because the law’s purpose is remedial and serves to compel government compliance to the law. In addition, the employee argued that there is a long precedent in Pennsylvania that actual damages are equivalent to economic and non-economic damages. Furthermore, the employee argues that not awarding non-economic damages “would undermine the very purpose of the law to protect and encourage employee reporters of waste and wrongdoing.”

The Court approached this as an issue of statutory interpretation and held that the law must be liberally construed to allow non-economic damages, thus fulfilling the remedial purpose of the Whistleblower Law. Furthermore, the Court found that reading “actual damages” as solely economic damages would be superfluous considering the statute’s inclusion of different types of economic damages under the allowed types of recovery. The Court agreed with the employee that Pennsylvania’s precedence historically supports the finding that actual damages includes non-economic damages. The Court stressed that the state must allow recovery for non-economic harms such as humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish in order to make Plaintiff whole. Going forward, Bailets is significant in that it will open the door for more claims under the Whistleblower Law and allow for a greater recovery for successful claimants.

For more information, please call our Philadelphia whistleblower lawyers at Sidkoff Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

Supreme Court Holds Fourth Amendment to Obtain Search Warrant for Automobiles

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Justice Sotomayor, delivering the majority opinion in Collins v. Virginia, held that the automobile exemption does not permit warrantless searches of automobiles located in the home or curtilage. 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3210 (U.S. Supreme Court, May 29, 2018). In Collins, the police were investigating two highspeed traffic violations involving a stolen motorcycle.

Officer Rhodes, while investigating the matter, obtained photographs of Ryan Collins with a motorcycle fitting the description of the motorcycle involved in the traffic violations. Upon obtaining this information, Rhodes drove to Collins’ girlfriend’s home and observed what appeared to be a motorcycle underneath a tarp in the driveway. Rhodes, without a search warrant, walked on to the residential property, removed the tarp, and determined that the motorcycle was the one involved with the traffic incidents. Rhodes, after taking pictures of the motorcycle, returned to his car and waited for Collins to arrive. Collins was arrested and although he filed a pretrial motion to exclude evidence, Collins was convicted. The trial court, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the evidence was admissible because Rhodes had probable cause and that this case would fall under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Collins argued that the motorcycle was protected by the Fourth Amendment because, although not inside the home, the Fourth Amendment applies to “the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home” known as the “curtilage.” Secondly, Collins argued that even though Rhodes was searching a vehicle, the automobile exceptions does not grant unwarranted entry of the curtilage of one’s property.

The Court, in assessing Collins’ first argument determined that due to the location and design, his driveway was part of the curtilage. The driveway in this case was located alongside the house and was partially enclosed by brick walls on two sides and enclosed by the home on a third. Due to the driveways inherent attachment to the home the Court found that it was deserving of the same protection as a front porch, or side garden, and thus concluded that the driveway was part of the home’s curtilage.

The Court was faced with a much more difficult question when forced to assess the second issue in this matter, the automobile exception. The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment states that police may search one’s automobile without a warrant if there is sufficient probable cause to do so. The reasoning behind this doctrine is that due to the inherent ability for an automobile to escape and drive off, the police are granted easier access in order to obtain necessary evidence. The Court rejected the argument that the automobile exceptions grants the police the ability to enter onto private property and conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. The Court further declined to expand the scope of the automobile exception and based their decision on the foundation that, although they may have the right to search the vehicle without a warrant, they must also have the right to access the object itself. In this matter, Rhodes was without right to enter the private property, and thus his search of the motorcycle was unlawful. The Court held that the privacy of the home is paramount and to expand the scope of the automobile exception to allow for warrantless searches of a vehicle in the home or curtilage would violate the Fourth Amendment.

At the Law Offices of Sidkoff, Pincus & Green our experienced Pennsylvania and New Jersey attorneys handle many types of legal matters, including civil rights litigation. If you are interested in having a consultation with one of our Philadelphia business lawyers, please call us at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Third Circuit Upholds FLSA Standards 

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In a recent case before the Third Circuit, the Court upheld the willfulness standard necessary to extend the limitations period for FLSA claims while allowing a good faith standard for awarding liquidated damages. Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cty., 872 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, Lackawanna County, for failing to pay overtime wages in violation of the FLSA. The employee Plaintiffs each worked two part time jobs for Defendant, who tracked the hours worked for each Plaintiffs’ jobs individually but neglected to aggregate the hours between the jobs resulting in a failure to pay overtime wages. Plaintiffs appealed from a lower court decision finding that Defendant did not willfully violate the FLSA but still awarded liquidated damages due to Defendant’s lack of good faith attempts of compliance to the FLSA.

The Court upheld the lower court’s decision that Defendant did not willfully violate the FLSA. Finding a willful violation is important for an FLSA claim because it extends the limitations period from two years to three years thereby enabling the plaintiff to recover an additional year of lost pay. To show willfulness, plaintiff cannot just show that defendant had a general awareness of the FLSA, but plaintiff must show actual awareness of the specific FLSA violation. Here, the Court upheld the lower court’s finding that Defendant did not meet the willfulness standard, and thus Plaintiffs were not eligible for an extension of the FLSA limitations period.

While the Court found that Defendant did not willfully violate the FLSA, they upheld that Defendant was liable for liquidated damages under a good faith standard. In the lower court, Plaintiffs argued that Defendant was liable for liquidated damages because they willfully violated the FLSA. To the contrary, Defendant argued that they were not liable for liquidated damages because they acted in good faith and the FLSA violations were unintentional. The lower court found that Plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated damages; however, their ruling was based on Defendant’s failure to prove good faith rather than Plaintiff’s willfulness argument. In this case, Plaintiffs argued that the lower court’s finding in favor of liquidated damages reaffirmed their assertion that Defendant was willful and thereby entitled them to the extended limitations period in addition to liquidated damages. However, the Third Circuit held that the lower court’s ruling had no bearing on the extension of the limitations period because it was based merely on Defendant’s lack of evidence of good faith attempts at FLSA compliance and not on their willfulness.

Overall, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the need to show willfulness to extend the limitations period for overtime violations claims under the FLSA. However, if an employer cannot provide sufficient evidence of good faith attempts at FLSA compliance, then employees are entitled to liquidated damages.

For more information, call our Philadelphia employment lawyers for Fair Labor Standards Act in Philadelphia and South Jersey at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

 

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US Supreme Court Enforces Individual Arbitration Agreements

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In May 2018, the Supreme Court in Epic System Corp. v. Lewis ruled in favor of employers in a matter involving the enforcement of individualized arbitration agreements. 2018 WL 2292444. In this case, the plaintiffs were all workers who had signed arbitration agreements which required them to pursue their grievances through individualized arbitration. Plaintiffs instead attempted to sue under two central claims. First, the plaintiffs insisted that the arbitration agreements should not be enforced because of  the “saving clause” of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) which allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” in combination with the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) which governs workers’ rights to “bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.” Secondly, the plaintiffs argue that even if the “saving clause” of the FAA does not protect their claim, Congress intended for the NLRA and not the FAA to be the controlling regulation.

When faced with determining the merits of the plaintiffs’ first argument, the Court relied primarily on the text of the regulation to determine the meaning and implications of the “saving clause.” When analyzing the clause, the Court focused on the inclusion of the term “any contract.” Id. at 6. The Court believed that this language instructs the courts to treat all contracts, including arbitration agreements, equally. The reason the interpretation of an equal treatment requirement is significant is that under general contract law, the court may only choose to invalidate a contract under the general defenses of fraud, duress, or unconscionability. Id. at 6. The majority held that the illegality claim was not a claim of unconscionability, but instead narrowly interpreted the argument to be no more than stating a contract should not be enforced “because it requires bilateral arbitration.” Therefore, the majority denied plaintiffs’ first claim because they found that the defense was not founded in the traditional defense to contracts, and thus not covered under the “saving clause” of the FAA.

Similar to its denial of the first argument, the majority focused primarily on the text of the NLRA in determining Congress intention regarding NLRA. Plaintiffs’ argument rests on the language in §7 of the NLRA which guarantees workers the right “to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.” Plaintiffs’ claim that the language of this act prevents the enforcement of agreements which inhibit the workers right to engage in class action suits. The Court in this matter did not find that the language provided in §7 provided a clear congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act. In making its decision the majority focused on the direct language of the act and refused to read into the meaning of “concerted action for the purpose of collective bargaining.” The Court held that not only did this language fail to amount to a clear congressional command to overrule the FAA, but it also failed to establish any relation to class action lawsuits. The Court found that since Congress is well aware of how to explicitly state that one act is overruling another and chose not to do so in the NLRA, Congress did not intend for this act to override the FAA. Since the language was placed along with actions involving the forming and joining of labor organizations and collective bargaining, it was intended to mean concerted action in furtherance of those actions, not workers’ involvement in class action suits.

For more information, call our business lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

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