Category: Trial Lawyers

Philadelphia Police Misconduct Lawyers: $40 Million in Settlements

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Over the last four years, police misconduct lawsuits within Philadelphia have spiked. Over 600 cases have been settled, resulting in close to $40 million in payments. According to MuckRock, an organization which helps individuals in filing governmental requests for information through the Freedom of Information Act, the largest settlements have involved police related shootings. Compared to other major cities such as San Francisco and Austin, Philadelphia has settled five times as many Police misconduct cases. Most common were cases involving assault and excessive force. Shooting related cases lead to the bulk share of the dollars settled; over $14 million dollars have been paid out to these victims and their families.

The biggest specific payout involved a shooting where police thought a man was intruding a building in which he lived. The family settled for $ 2.5 million dollars. Settlements continue to increase as the year progresses. In a highly controversial case in 1999 which involved the shooting and death of a male individual, the case was settled for $ 712,000 dollars. Recently in February a case was settled for $200,000 involving a man who was brutally beaten by police prior to his arrest which was also not warranted. The man broke his orbital bone, had lacerations on his face and was bleeding badly. Video surveillance displayed evidence that thus man was falsely arrested.

For more information, call Philadelphia police misconduct lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Report: Jury Awards Man for Unnecessary Skin Grafts

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Plaintiff, Wismond Brissett, a 45-year-old truck driver, was cooking without wearing a shirt when the cooking grease caught fire. In Brissett v. Watts, Brissett was awarded $3 million for pain and suffering after Dr. David C. Watts failed to meet the standard of care. He performed a skin graft, which caused the plaintiff unnecessary pain and scarring.  He was brought to the hospital and was diagnosed as having first- and second-degree burns on eight percent of his body.

Brissett was referred to Watts and his practice, Plastic & Cosmetic Surgery Institute for the burns, after an initial meeting with his primary care doctor, where Watts diagnosed Brissett as having first-, second- and third-degree burns over 15 to 20% of his body and explained that Brissett needed surgery.

During the surgery, the burns were debrided, and then skin was taken from Brissett’s thigh and grafted to both his forearms and the right side of his chest. The skin graft left Brissett with severe scars and pain. Brissett’s wounds would have healed with only minor scarring if the surgery had not been performed.

Philadelphia Trial Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Victims of Unnecessary Skin Grafts

Philadelphia trial lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green offer a wide range of legal counseling to injured victims in Philadelphia. We are available to our clients 24 hours a day. No case is too big or too small. Our Philadelphia trial lawyers have diverse skills and decades of experience in varied legal services. Located in the heart of Center City, Philadelphia we serve clients throughout the Philadelphia area. Call 215-574-0600 to schedule a consultation or submit an online contact form.

Pennsylvania Landlord-Tenant Law: Holdover Tenancy and Eviction

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Under Pennsylvania law, a holdover tenant is an individual who “unjustifiably refuses to surrender possession of a leasehold premises at the end of the term of the lease.”  U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Schlavo Bros., Inc., 668 F.2d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 14.1 n.1 (1977)).  A landlord may sue a holdover tenant for possession and recovery of damages suffered due to the tenant’s refusal to surrender the property.  See id.

“When a tenant holds over the landlord has a ‘choice of remedies.’  He [the landlord] might have looked upon the tenant as a trespasser and summarily ejected him, or he might have treated him in holding over as a tenant by sufferance, or he might have regarded the holding over as a continuance under the terms of the lease.”  H. F. D. No. 26, Inc. v. Middletown Merchandise Mart, 467 F.2d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 1972) (quoting City of Pittsburgh v. Charles Zubik & Sons, 171 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. 1961)).  “Once a landlord has exercised his choice of remedies and determined how he plans to treat a holdover tenant, he may not alter his position.”  H.F.D., supra at 256 (citing Emery v. Metzner, 156 A.2d 627, 631(Pa.Super. 1959)).

A landlord who repossesses rental property through eviction suspends the tenant’s obligation to pay rent.  Walnut-Juniper Co. v. McKee, Berger & Mansueto, Inc., 344 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa.Super. 1975).  Once a landlord retakes possession from the lessee tenant, the landlord is precluded from a claim of holdover tenancy as a matter of law.  See Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 1.2 (stating: “[a] landlord-tenant relationship exists only if the landlord transfers the right to possession of the leased property.”).

Although the termination of the landlord-tenant relationship may restrict a landlord from asserting a claim of holdover tenancy, a landlord may pursue other legal remedies.  For example, a landlord who reclaims possession of the premises is still entitled to recover damages if the former tenant leaves behind personal property.  See Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 12.3 cmt. l (stating that landlord may recover from tenant cost of removing and storing personal property left behind, and for any other damages he sustains).

If you think that you might have a claim – as either a landlord or tenant – for legal remedies stemming from a landlord-tenant relationship, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Unlawful Access to Stored Communications under Pennsylvania law

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Pennsylvania law provides that “it is an offense to obtain, alter or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage by intentionally: (1) accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) exceeding the scope of one’s authorization to access the facility.”  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5741(a).  Subsection (a) of the statute does not apply, however, with respect to conduct authorized: (1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communication service; (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user; or (3) under certain circumstances related to governmental access (pursuant to sections 5743 and 5744).

A party aggrieved by a violation of Section 5741 can bring a civil cause of action against the person or entity which committed the violation.  See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747; Klump v. Nazareth Area School Dist., 425 F.Supp.2d 622 (E.D.Pa. 2006).  In a civil action under Section 5747, appropriate relief includes: such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; damages (equal to the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000); and reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747(b), (c).

If you think you might have an action under Pennsylvania’s Unlawful Access to Stored Communications statute, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Survival Actions in Pennsylvania

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The Survival Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302, provides that all causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.  A survival action refers to a personal injury claim, brought by the decedent’s estate, which would have been brought by the decedent had he or she lived. For example, the decedent’s estate may seek to recover for pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to his or her death. In contrast to a wrongful death action, a survival action is not a new cause of action occasioned by the death of the decedent; rather, it is a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff that survives his or her death.  Sunderland v. R.A. Barlow Homebuilders, 2002 PA Super 16, 791 A.2d 384 (2002).

Damages awarded in a survival action are based upon the pecuniary loss that the decedent, and not his or her dependents, suffered. Thus, in survival cases, the action enforces the liability of the tortfeasor to the decedent’s estate, not to his or her relatives or dependents. Damages recovered in a survival action for personal injuries to a decedent are subject to liability for debts because the survival action is a chose belonging to the decedent and passing to decedent’s personal representative with the other assets for administration. In re Lucabaugh’s Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 68, 1951 WL 3452 (Orphans’ Ct. 1951).

For more information related to filing a survival action, please contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, with offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and attorneys licensed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Call 215-574-0600.

Wrongful Death Actions in Pennsylvania

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The purpose of the Wrongful Death Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301, is to compensate the decedent’s relatives for their loss. Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 Pa. 588, 606 A.2d 427, 431 (1992). A wrongful death action does not compensate the decedent; it compensates the survivors (spouse, parents, children) for damages which they have sustained as a result of the decedent’s death. The damages recovered are therefore not part of the decedent’s estate; rather, they constitute compensation to the individual family members for their loss. Tulewicz., 606 A.2d at 431.  These damages can include the value of the services the victim who died would have rendered to his family if he had lived.” Slaseman v. Myers, 309 Pa.Super. 537, 545, 455 A.2d 1213, 1218 (1983).

Under the wrongful death act the widow or family is entitled, in addition to costs, to compensation for the loss of the contributions decedent would have made for such items as shelter, food, clothing, medical care, education, entertainment, gifts and recreation. Linebaugh v. Lehr, 351 Pa.Super. 135, 505 A.2d 303, 304-305 (1986).  Under Pennsylvania law, a child can recover in a wrongful death action for the loss of companionship, comfort, society and guidance of a parent. Steiner by Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co., 358 Pa.Super. 505, 510, 517 A.2d 1348, 1356 (1986), aff’d. 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988). This element of damages has also been described as “loss of guidance, tutelage, and moral upbringing.” Buchecker v. Reading Co., 271 Pa.Super. 35, 57, 412 A.2d 147, 158 (1979).

The damages recovered under a wrongful death action brought for the benefit of the spouse, children or parents of the deceased, whether or not citizens or residents of the Commonwealth or elsewhere, will be distributed to the beneficiaries in the proportion they would take the personal estate of the decedent in the case of intestacy and without liability to creditors of the deceased person under the statutes of Pennsylvania.10 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Probate, Estates, and Trusts § 12:31 (2d ed.). Awards pursuant to wrongful death claims, therefore, pass outside of the decedent’s taxable probate estate under Pennsylvania’s inheritance tax provisions, and any claims by a decedent’s creditors cannot be made against a wrongful death award.  In re Estate of Merryman, 669 A.2d 1059 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). Thus, a child’s share of a wrongful death award under a federal statute is not subject to payment of the decedent’s debts where the federal statute makes proceeds directly payable not to the estate, but to the personal representative on behalf of the decedent’s surviving spouse and children.  In re Sibilia’s Estate, 279 Pa. 459, 124 A. 137 (1924).

If you belive you have a claim for the wrongful death of a spouse, child or parent, please contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, with offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and attorneys licensed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Local Counsel is Required in Federal Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

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The Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. District for the Easter District of Pennsylvania require that any attorney who is not a member of the Eastern District must hire an attorney that is a member as associate counsel of record.  Local Civil Rule of Procedure 83.5.2, titled “Associate Counsel,” states that unless appearing on behalf of the U.S. Government or a department or agency of the U.S. Government, any attorney who is not a member of the bar of the Eastern District, shall have a local counsel of record whom all pleadings, motions, notices and other papers can be served.  See, L.R.Civ.P. 83.5.2(a).

Non-member attorneys, who wish to appear in a case, must have local counsel file a Motion for their Pro Hac Vice Admission, pursuant to L.R.Civ.P. 83.5.2(b). The cost of filing such a motion is currently $40.  A sample form for a Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Eastern District is provided by the Clerk of Court and can be found on the Court’s website.  This form requires the applicant to state, inter alia, where he/she is currently licensed to practice, that the applicant affirms that he/she is in good standing of those state and/or federal bars, and that the applicant pledges to act in accordance with the law.  The local counsel, acting as sponsor for the applicant, must certify that, inter alia,  the applicant’ “private and personal character is good.”

Although the sample form provided by the Clerk is generally accepted by the judges of the Eastern District, it is important that local counsel be familiar with the preferences of each judge, because the form is not accepted by all.  For example, the Honorable Joel H. Slomsky provides in his “Policies and Procedures for Scheduling and Motion” that the form application provided by the Clerk is “inadequate.”  Judge Slomsky requires that counsel moving for the pro hac vice must explain why the party desires the attorney to participate and why the attorney is especially qualified to do so.

The attorneys at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green are capable of acting as local counsel and appear regularly in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; they are familiar with the local rules of courts, trial practice, discovery procedures, and the preferences of the local judges.  Please contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, with offices located in Philadelphia, if you have a need for local counsel.

Tortious Interference Claims in Pennsylvania (Absence of Privilege or Justification Defined)

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The tort of intentional interference with existing contractual relationships is governed by section 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted in Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978). Section 766 provides as follows: One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract. Rest. 2d Torts § 766 (1979); Walnut St. Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 2009 PA Super 191, 982 A.2d 94, 97-98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) aff’d, 610 Pa. 371, 20 A.3d 468 (2011).

The necessary elements of the cause of action are (1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the complainant and a third party; (2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual relationship; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage as a result of defendant’s conduct. Walnut St. Associates, Inc., 982 A.2d at 98.

With respect to the third element, proof must be shown that the defendant’s actions were improper under the circumstances; this is generally done through consideration of the factors listed in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 767.  The Restatement holds as follows, “In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract … is improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors: (a) the nature of the actor’s conduct; (b) the actor’s motive; (c) the interests of the others with which the actor’s conduct interferes; (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor; (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other; (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference; and (g) the relations between the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979.)  There will not be liability for this tort where one intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract by giving truthful information or honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 762; Walnut St. Associates, Inc., 982 A.2d at 98-99.  In addition, there are other factors listed in sections 768 through 773 of the Restatement (Second) that set forth specific circumstances in which interference with contractual relationships is not improper. Walnut St. Associates, Inc., 982 A.2d at 98-99.

If you believe that you have a potential claim for tortious interference, or you are being sued for tortious interference, please feel free to contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, with offices in Phladelphia, Pennsylvania and attorneys licensed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Tortious Interference Claims in Pennsylvania (Prospective Clients Defined)

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Under Pennsylvania law, the requisite elements of a cause of action for interference with prospective contractual relations are as follows: (1) a prospective contractual relationship;(2) the purpose or intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing the relation from occurring;(3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage resulting from the defendant’s conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979); Phillips v. Selig, 2008 PA Super 244, 959 A.2d 420, 428 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). With respect to the first element, the term “prospective contractual relationship,” has been regarded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as something less than a contractual hope, but something more than a mere hope. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 209, 412 A.2d 466, 471 (1979).

In determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood or probability of a prospective contractual relationship, courts will apply an objective standard and have consistently required more evidence than a current business or contractual relationship.  Philips, 959 A.2d at 428,429.  For example, in Thompson, the Court declined to find a prospective contractual relationship based on evidence that the parties had renewed a year-to-year lease for mineral rights for ten consecutive years.  Thompson, 412 A.2d at 472. Likewise, in Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 983 (Pa.Super.1997), the Superior Court refused to acknowledge a prospective contractual relationship when a university administrator’s contract was not renewed after almost twenty-five years on the job. Strickland, 700 A.2d at 985. Accordingly, where a plaintiff attempts to prove a prospective contractual relationship by relying on an existing contractual relationship, the courts will deem that evidence, by itself, as insufficient as a matter of law.

If you believe that you have a potential claim for tortious interference, or you are being sued for tortious interference, please feel free to contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, with offices in Phladelphia, Pennsylvania and attorneys licensed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Civil Rights Actions under Section 1983: Brief Overview

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“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law….”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“In determining whether a Section 1983 action has been stated the inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements of the action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”  Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 756 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2000) (citing Costa v. Frye, 588 A.2d 97, 99 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991)).  “[T]o be under color of state law, the actor must have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”  Frazier, supra.

Additionally, a local municipality is a “person” who may be directly liable under Section 1983.  Id.  See also Costa, supra (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978)). Generally, “[s]ection 1983 imposes liability on a municipality when an official policy of the municipality causes an employee, acting under the color of law, to violate another’s constitutional rights.” Frazier, supra.

If you think you might have an action under Section 1983, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.