Category: Employment Law

Sixth Circuit Rules Discrimination Against Transgender/LGBTQ Employees Violates Title VII

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transgender/lgbtq discrimination

On Wednesday, March 6, 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that discrimination against transgender/LGBTQ employees is discrimination based on sex, a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the employee, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. 2018 WL 1177669, at *1 (C.A.6 (Mich.), 2018). The employee was terminated soon after informing the owner of the funeral home that she planned to transition and would represent herself as a woman. After receiving the employee’s complaint, the EEOC investigated the allegations of sex discrimination and learned in addition that the funeral home had in place a discriminatory clothing policy, providing males with clothing adhering with the dress codes, while woman received no such benefit. The EEOC filed suit on behalf of the employee, alleging violations of Title VII based on the termination of the employee and the discriminatory clothing policy.

The Sixth Circuit ultimately found in favor of the EEOC on the unlawful discrimination claim, holding that firing an employee “because of their failure to conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII.” Furthermore, the Court determined that the funeral home could not use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as a defense because there would be no substantial burden to their religious exercise by continuing to employ the individual.

For more information, call our employment lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

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Third Circuit Holds that Employee’s Anti-Vaccination Beliefs were not Religious

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently affirmed the opinion of the District Court that a medical center employee’s anti-vaccination beliefs were not religious in nature. The employee had been terminated for refusing to be vaccinated against the flu and claimed that his termination constituted religious discrimination. His case was dismissed by the District Court. The Court found that although his beliefs were sincere, they were not religious in nature and not protected by Title VII.  This determination was affirmed by the Third Circuit.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Under Title VII, it is unlawful to terminate an employee because of their religion as all adverse employment action based on a person’s religious affiliation is prohibited by the Act. Under the statute, religion encompasses belief, unless an employer can show that they are unable to reasonably accommodate their observance without undue hardship.

The legal standard, with respect to the employee’s personally held beliefs, is whether they addressed the fundamental questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters, and whether they are comprehensive in nature and accompanied by certain formal and external signs. When discussing his own beliefs, the employee in this case stated that one should not harm their own body, that he believed the flu vaccine did more harm than good, and that bowing to the medical center’s policy would violate his conscience as to what he believed was right and wrong. Because his beliefs did not meet the threshold set by the standard, the Court ultimately found that his beliefs were not religious. The Court noted that anti-vaccination beliefs could be part of a broader religious faith, in which case, refusal might be protected.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Represent Victims of Religious Discrimination

If you suspect that you have suffered an adverse employment action because of your religious beliefs, the Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. may be able help. To discuss your case, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online. Our legal team handles all types of employment related litigation.

Court Defines Supervisor Under Title VII

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued a precedential opinion interpreting what it means to be a supervisor in a hostile work environment case. The Court found that a supervisor is someone who controls a sizeable amount of the hours employees work, and/or someone who determines whether employees will be assigned work.

Moody v. Atlantic City Board of Education

Employee Michelle Moody was hired by the Atlantic City Board of Education (BOE) to serve as a substitute custodian in 2011. Moody alleged that she was unhappy with the unsteady nature of her employment, as she was only gainfully employed when the primary custodian could not work. She wanted to work more hours and raised her concerns with a member of the BOE, who suggested that she speak to the custodial foremen of different districts. The BOE member told her that these foremen were responsible for delegating authority to select which substitute custodian would fill in at schools in their respective districts.

Moody then contacted 10 foremen from different school districts, including one named Maurice Marshall. Marshall allegedly began harassing Moody immediately after she started work. According to the Court’s opinion, he allegedly suggested that he would give her more work if she performed sexual favors for him. After a litany of disturbing incidents, including explicit text messages, unwanted sexual contact, and unwanted visits to her home, Moody succumbed to Marshall’s unwanted advances. Although she never received more work hours, after reporting Marshall, her work hours steadily declined.

Determining the Meaning of Supervisor

Moody filed a claim in the District of New Jersey, which was ultimately dismissed on grounds that Marshall was not her supervisor, and that she suffered no tangible adverse employment action. The Third Circuit reversed that decision after an extensive review of Marshall’s role in assigning work to other employees. The Court examined a U.S. Supreme Court precedent that interpreted the term of supervisor. Ultimately, the Third Circuit determined that Marshall had the power to decide whether Moody worked at all and had authority to set her hours, falling under the Supreme Court’s definition of a supervisor. The court also found that during the times Moody was chosen to fill in at Marshall’s school, he was her immediate supervisor.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Handle All Types of Sexual Harassment and Discrimination Employment Claims

If you have suffered adverse employment action due to sexual harassment or discrimination, you may be entitled to compensation. To arrange a consultation with one of our Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C., call us today at 215-574-0600, or contact us online.

Court Ruling on Employee Abuse of FMLA Leave

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Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employer’s honest belief that an employee misused their rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was sufficient to defeat the employee’s claim for retaliation. This holds true even if it turns out that the employer was mistaken, and that the employee was not misusing their rights under the FMLA. Pennsylvania is within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, the employer, Mondelez, had an FMLA policy in place. The policy made clear that any employee who fraudulently misused FMLA time would be subject to discipline and possible termination. The company also had an additional policy that provided discipline if an employee was found to have engaged in dishonest acts. One of Mondelez’s employees, Frederick Capps, was experiencing bouts of severe pain following a bilateral hip replacement that he underwent in 2003. Mondelez provided him with intermittent leave under the FMLA during these bouts of pain.

One day in 2013, Capps took the day off alleging it was for pain related to his medical condition. Later that evening, he went to a bar and was arrested for a DWI while driving home. Although he was scheduled to work the next day, he called out complaining of pain related to his hip surgery. Capps’s employer learned of his arrest in the newspaper, and discovered that he fraudulently requested FMLA for the day after his arrest and on subsequent court dates; the absences were not related to his medical condition. As a result, his employment was terminated.

Termination Retaliation

Mr. Capps sued his employer for allegedly retaliating against him for taking FMLA leave. The District Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Mondelez Global, LLC on grounds that it acted on an honest belief that Capps had been abusing FMLA leave. Although the Court ultimately found that he had not established a prima facie case of retaliation, it noted that Mondelez had established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Capps, stating that he violated the company’s Dishonestly Policy. Because the employer acted in good faith, the Court ruled in its favor, concluding that even if the employer’s belief turned out to be untrue, it still would have prevailed because it had established that it acted in good faith.

This is consistent with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ rulings in other discrimination claims, such as age-discrimination and Title VII cases, whereby an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination will not be defeated by a plaintiff demonstrating that the belief was ultimately incorrect.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Represent Clients in Employment and Business Matters

The statutes, regulations, and case law that govern the employer-employee relationship are constantly evolving. If you have questions about a legal situation, contact the Philadelphia employment lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. today to schedule a confidential consultation. We can be reached at 215-574-0600 or by submitting a convenient online contact form.

Eastern District of Pennsylvania Rules Against Plaintiff’s Claim that Arbitration Clause is Unconscionable

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In Curtis v. Cintas Corporation, Plaintiff was terminated by her employer and she asserted claims for racial discrimination and retaliation.  229 F.Supp.3d 312, 315 (E.D. Pa. 2017).  Although Plaintiff sought to litigate her case in court, Defendant moved to dismiss her claims, and in the alternative, stay proceedings pending arbitration, as Defendant claimed that Plaintiff’s employment agreement contained an arbitration clause. In response, Plaintiff asserted that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore, invalid and unenforceable.

Under Pennsylvania law, to prove a claim of unconscionability, a plaintiff must prove that the contract was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. Substantive unconscionability occurs when the contractual terms are unreasonable or grossly favorable to one side, which the disfavored party does not assent to.  In this case, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant is inherently favored because the employer pays the costs for arbitration.  However, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania pointed to case law stating that limiting costs to one party does not support a finding of substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process in which an agreement is reached, but the form of the agreement is unclear.  Here, Plaintiff claimed that the agreement was procedurally unconscionable because she signed only on the last page, and that page did not contain an arbitration clause.  However, the Court explained that there is no requirement in Pennsylvania to affix a signature to each section or page of an agreement to manifest an in intent to be bound by the terms.

For more information, call our employment lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Third Circuit Says Employees Should Be Paid for Rest Breaks

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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), employers must compensate employees for breaks less than 20 minutes, even if they are not performing any work during their break time.

In the case presented to the Court, the employer was a company that produced business publications that were sold by sales representatives over the phone. The representatives were able to take breaks whenever they wanted to, and for any length of time. Their employer did not require them to remain on the premises during their break time. However, whenever these employees were logged off their computer for longer than a minute and a half, they were not paid.

The United States Department of Labor sued the company under a federal regulation that states break periods between five and 20 minutes are customarily paid, and must be counted as hours worked. The trial court concluded that the employer violated the FLSA, and the employer appealed, arguing that a different regulation governed its practices. According to the employer, these breaks were off duty, when employees were completely relieved of duty. The off-duty regulation specifically defines these periods as times when an employee is completely relieved of duty such that they can use the time effectively for their own purposes. The regulation describes this as a fact specific inquiry. The employer argued that since employees were free to leave for as long as they wanted, with no obligation to return to work, even brief breaks did not need to be compensated under the off-duty regulation.

The Third Circuit employed a common canon of construction; where there are two regulations arguably on point, the more specific regulation is controlling. Here, because the off-duty regulation was more generic than the rule governing break policies, it was not controlling. The Court characterized this as a bright line rule, providing that employers must pay employees for any rest breaks lasting 20 minutes or less. At the time of the Third Circuit’s ruling, no other Circuit Court had ruled on this question.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. Advocate for Rights of Employees

At Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C., we advocate for our clients in all types of FLSA and unpaid overtime claims. To schedule a confidential consultation, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online. Our Philadelphia employment lawyers are ready to discuss your case today.

Third Circuit Defines “Willfulness” Under FLSA

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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a precedential opinion regarding “willful” violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).   There is a two-year statute of limitations under the FLSA unless the violations are deemed willful, in which case there is a three- year statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs in this case were a class of part-time Lackawanna County employees who worked in two separate part-time positions. According to the Court, Lackawanna County failed to aggregate the hours of the employees for purposes of calculating overtime.    The lawsuit asserts that Lackawanna County became aware that it was violating the FLSA in 2011, and several months later, it began aggregating the hours of the employees in calculating overtime pay. During the trial, the county admitted to violating the FLSA, but argued that the violation was not willful.    The trial court determined that the defendants’ poor time keeping records amounted to willful violations of the FLSA.

The Third Circuit disagreed and reasoned that there was no evidence that Lackawanna County was specifically aware of the FLSA rule it was violating. It opined that a plaintiff must show evidence of the employer’s awareness of a violation of the FLSA overtime mandate. The Court contrasted a case of clear willful violation, wherein an employer deliberately misclassified employees for nine years, and another case where a family failed to pay its nanny minimum wage.  Here, Lackawanna County addressed the problem within a year of learning it was violating the FLSA. The Court noted that it was likely a bureaucratic failure, and not a deliberate violation.

Philadelphia Overtime Dispute Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Litigate FLSA Claims

At Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, we routinely represent plaintiffs in overtime and wage dispute matters. To schedule a consultation with a Philadelphia overtime dispute lawyer, call us today at 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Court Rules that Accommodations for Indefinite Leave are Not Reasonable

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An Appellate Court in Connecticut recently ruled that a reasonable accommodation for medical leave does not require employers to wait indefinitely for an employee’s medical condition to resolve itself. In the case of Thomson v. Department of Social Services, the plaintiff informed her employer that she would be taking a leave of absence from her work, but did not provide her employer with a time frame for her return. She also did not respond to her employer’s subsequent attempts to reach out to her in order to determine when she planned to return.

According to the Court, this employee essentially asked her employer to hold her position open for her indefinitely while she attempted to recover. The Court, relying on federal laws, found that this was not a reasonable accommodation request. The plaintiff, according to the Court, could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on these facts.

The employee informed her supervisor that she would be taking “over thirty days” leave depending on whether the lung condition resolved itself. And during a deposition, she confirmed that she did not know how long she was going to be out of work to recover from her health condition.

At the time she left her employment to take leave, the employee filled out a number of forms for her employer. The information she listed on these forms was incoherent and confusing. Her employer even reached out to her by certified mail for additional information, and did not receive a response. When the time came that she was required to submit further information and did not, her employer terminated her. The Court upheld the termination, because the accommodation that she requested was deemed unreasonable.

Philadelphia Employment Lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green Represent Clients in Employment Disputes

If you are in need of a Philadelphia employment lawyer, contact Sidkoff, Pincus & Green. To learn more about how our dedicated team of trial attorneys can help you, call 215-574-0600 or contact us online.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Employer Liable

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Whistleblower Case Brought by Employee

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes that an employee who brings a claim against his employer under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law can hold his employer liable where the employee’s good-faith report of wrongdoing resulted in a retaliatory demotion.

In O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, 566 Pa. 161 (2001), the appellant O’Rourke was employed by the appellee, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“Department”). During his employment, O’Rourke became aware of a scheme where thousands of pounds of meat products were being stolen from the culinary department. In response, O’Rourke filed a report regarding this activity of wrongdoing and charged various workers and supervisors with theft and mismanagement. Shortly after transmitting his report, O’Rourke began experiencing a hostile working environment and was demoted from his position at the Department.

The Court ruled that the Department failed to prove that its actions occurred for reasons separate from O’Rourke’s report of wrongdoing, and failed to rebut O’Rourke’s prima facie case. Therefore, O’Rourke was entitled to compensation pursuant to the state’s whistleblower law.

For more information, call our whistleblower lawyers in Philadelphia  at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.

E.D.P.A. Overrules Motion to Dismiss

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Claims Plaintiff Alleged Sufficient Facts Demonstrating Pervasive Sexual Harassment

A claim for sexual harassment can be established by proving a hostile or abusive work environment. To prove such a claim, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability[, where an employer is liable for an employee’s negligent actions or omissions that occur during the course of the employee’s employment].” Hawk v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3445, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

The trial judge considers the totality of the circumstances when considering a sexual harassment claim. The judge will consider factors such as, the frequency of the harassment, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, whether it unreasonably interferes with employee’s work performance, and its effect on the employee’s psychological well-being. For instance, in Hawk, the judge took into consideration that the harassment occurred every day in the form of unwelcome phone calls to the employee, that the harassment was severe by being physically grabbed and shoved against a wall, the employee was humiliated in the sense that she was followed by the harasser around the workplace and was constantly interrupted when conversing with other men co-workers by the harasser, and the employee was emotionally distraught when discussing her harasser during an interview with her employer. The Pennsylvania Eastern District Court found that a jury could “certainly” find that the employee was harassed and that it would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in the same position, denying a motion to dismiss.

For more information, call our sexual harassment lawyers in Philadelphia at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green at 215-574-0600 or submit an online inquiry.