Discrimination Claims in Pennsylvania under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act – Brief Overview

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The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) makes it unlawful for creditors to discriminate against any credit applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status or age.15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).

The ECOA applies to “every aspect of an applicant’s dealings with a creditor regarding an application for credit or an existing credit extension (including, but not limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures; standards of creditworthiness; terms of credit; furnishing of credit information; revocation , alteration, or termination of credit; and collection procedures).”12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m).

Under the ECOA, a creditor is required to notify an applicant of any action on an application “within 30 days…after receipt of a completed application for credit.”15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1).When a creditor takes adverse action against an applicant, such as denying an application for credit, the applicant is entitled to a statement of reasons for such adverse action.15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2).

To establish a claim of discrimination under the ECOA, a plaintiff must show that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) applied for credit from defendant; (3) was qualified for credit; and (4) despite qualification, the plaintiff was denied credit.Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2004), abrog. on other grounds by In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).Additionally, because the ECOA applies to every aspect of an applicant’s dealings with a creditor regarding an application for credit or an existing extension of credit, a potential creditor’s refusal to provide an application form to a prospective applicant is also part of a “credit transaction” within the meaning of the ECOA.Chiang, supra at 265.Therefore, “a refusal to provide a loan application on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age would be a prototypical ECOA violation, as it would deny members of a protected class any access to credit.”Id.

If you believe that you might be a victim of unlawful discrimination under the ECOA, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus& Green in Philadelphia at 215-574-0600, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Implied Nonexclusive License as an Affirmative Defense to a Claim of Copyright Infringement in Pennsylvania

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Legal issues pertaining to intellectual property, such as copyright infringement, are governed by federal law. Specifically, copyright infringement is covered under the Copyright Act, at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq.To prove a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of original elements of the plaintiff’s work. Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 2005).

Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to “copy, distribute or display his work.” MacLean Associates, Inc. v. WM. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106). The owner of a copyright may transfer ownership by selling it or exclusively licensing it; transfers via exclusive licenses must be in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).An owner of a copyright may also grant a nonexclusive license to use the copyrighted work. MacLean, supra at 778-79.Because a nonexclusive license is expressly removed from the scope and language of § 204, courts have interpreted that a “nonexclusive license may be oral or implied because it does not amount to a ‘transfer’ of ownership.” Beholder Productions, Inc. v. Catona, 629 F. Supp.2d 490, 493 (E.D.Pa. 2009); see also MacLean, supra at 778.

The Third Circuit has found an implied license where three factors are present: “(1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes the particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work.” Beholder, supra at 494; see also National Ass’n For Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle, 184 Fed.App’x. 270, 275 (3d Cir. 2006). “A nonexclusive license may arise by implication where the creator of a work at a defendant’s request ‘hands it over, intending that the defendant copy and distribute it.’”Id.at 274 (quoting MacLean, supra at 779).

“Whether there is an implied license is determined by an objective inquiry into the facts; the private hopes of the creator are not relevant.” Scharle, supra at 275. If the defendant can establish that the plaintiff granted him an implied nonexclusive license, it serves as an affirmative defense against a claim of copyright infringement. Id.

If you think that you might have a claim, or are potentially facing a claim, under the Copyright Act, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Private Parties as State Actors under Section 1983

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“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law….”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Thus, to establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States that was committed by a person acting under color of state law.  Machon v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, 847 F.Supp.2d 734 (E.D.Pa. 2012).  Where a plaintiff lodges a Section 1983 claim against a private party (as opposed to a governmental entity), the defendant can be held liable where he is “fairly said to be a state actor.”  Pugh v. Downs, 641 F. Supp.2d 468, 472 (E.D.Pa. 2009).  See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (stating that our cases have insisted that conduct allegedly causing deprivation of federal rights be fairly attributable to the state).

A private party can be “fairly said to be a state actor” for purposes of Section 1983 under four tests.  First, under the “close nexus” test a private party can be fairly said to be a state actor where “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the [private] entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the state itself.”  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (holding state responsible for private decision where it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must be deemed to be that of the State).  Second, under the “symbiotic relationship” test a private party can be fairly said to be a state actor where “the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with a private party that “it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”  Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) (holding privately owned restaurant’s refusal to serve an African American customer constituted state action where the restaurant leased space from a parking garage owned by state agency).  Third, under the “joint action” test a private party can be fairly said to be a state actor where a private party is a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”  Lugar,457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (1982).  Fourth, under the “public function” test a private party can be fairly said to be a state actor where the private party has been “delegated…a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”  Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468-470, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) (state action found where private actor administered election of public officials).

If you think you might have an action under Section 1983, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Obamacare is a Game-Changer for Extra Income Earned By Doctors

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Penalties, Fines and Adverse Consequences Doctors should know about before Entering into PODS, Consulting Agreements and other Arrangements with Medical Device Manufacturers and Pharmaceutical Companies

The U.S. market size for orthopedic medical device R&D is estimated to be $1.3 billion in 2011, corresponding to 8% of market revenues[1]. The aging population and expanded medical insurance coverage has resulted in a growing profitability of the orthopedic implant market.   It is not unusual for a new medical device company to realize 30% annual growth and 30% – 35% EBITDA.[2]

Prior to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, which is commonly known as “Obamacare”,  manufacturers created a fake  research and development market using programs that had no intrinsic value to the companies or the patient population to bribe doctors with extra income gained from supposedly participating in the programs. In reality, the payments compensated the doctors for prescribing for patients the devices made by the bribing manufacturer. The bribes were disguised by:  the use of supposed consulting assignments; memberships on “medical advisory committees” set up by the manufacturers, royalties on contributions to minor, but insubstantial changes to the company’s products that were not needed except to fabricate an ostensibly legal  basis for compensating  the company’s doctor-customers; and other even more aggressive programs.

The  Hammer will be coming down on the blatantly illegal PODS

Beginning in around 2008, the entities that made and marketed orthopedic medical devices seduced doctors to become owners of their own distribution companies in an entity known as a “Physician Owned Distributor” or “POD”. This scheme put money directly into the hands of the doctors as a reward and incentive for the doctors’ efforts to boost sales of the participating manufacturer’s medical devises.

Here is how the POD’s typically work. Assume we have a manufacturer of orthopedic medical devices, known in our example as “Device-Co”; and assume also that Device-Co focused on spinal implants that were prescribed by spine surgeons. Device-Co approached a spine surgeon (whom we will call “Dr. Smith”), and offered to help Dr. Smith set up the Smith-POD – which would then be appointed as an independent sales representative to sell Device-Co’s spinal implants in the city were Dr. Smith had his surgical practice (“Practice City”). In this scenario, there would be one potential hurdle. Under existing federal conflict of interest laws and regulations on the books since the 1990’s, Dr. Smith could not be a buyer or prescriber of any medical device made by Device-Co. However, there was a ready (although highly suspect) solution:  Device-Co had made separate informal (and not written down) deals with “Competitor-Co,” one of its competitors that was similarly sponsoring spinal surgeons to set up PODS to sell products manufactured by Competitor-Co . We will assume for purposes of our example that Competitor-Co convinced Dr. Wilson, another spine surgeon in Practice City, to establish the Wilson-POD  to distribute spinal implant products made by Competitor-Co.

Under the POD business model, Dr. Smith would prescribe only spinal implants made by Competitor-Co that he purchased from the Wilson-POD . In return, Dr. Wilson would prescribe only spinal implants made by Device-Co that he purchased form the Smith-POD. Each of the spine surgeons would make a commission on the sales generated by his POD, and the two cooperating spinal implant manufacturers would insure that no other competitor selling spinal implant products could break into this market, no matter how good their products might be, or how much more reasonable their pricing. Under this scheme, Device-Co and Competitor-Co were happy to pay hefty sales commissions that otherwise would be paid to the support personnel anyway.

The Office of Inspector General says “No” to PODs

The Unites States Department of Health and Human Services Office has within its organization a body known as of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that is charged, along with other federal and state regulators, to identify and stop conflicts of interest and schemes that potentially could entice a doctor to prescribe a product, not because it was the most effective device at the best price, but because the doctor had a collateral financial interest in the sale. Since most implant operations in hospitals have some subsidy provided by the federal government through Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration network and similar programs, schemes that inflate the cost of implant products or that deter the doctor from acting on his best medical judgment are deemed a fraud on the US government.  The OIG, has already  identified  many of the compensation arrangements are directly correlated to the surgeons’ selection of medical devices, and therefore illegal, and the chief offender are PODs.[3]

In June 2011, five US senators requested that the OIG investigate the legality of PODs.  This prompted the Affordable Care Act (‘ACA”) to vastly increase the funding for the OIG  and other federal watchdogs under the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control program, the Medicaid Integrity Program, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The OIG investigations are not limited to device manufacturers since money has been allocated to 50 Medicaid Fraud Control Units for investigation and prosecution of criminal and civil actions against physicians and other  Medicaid providers  who may have committed patient fraud.[4] Moreover section 6002 of the ACA—the Physician Payment Sunshine Act—requires HHS to create and  operate a “sunshine” database of information disclosed by applicable manufacturers of all  financial relationships with physicians and hospitals. This means that the law requires every POD to be disclosed to HHS.

In addition, the states are now getting into the act. For example, New Hampshire has pending legislation designed to end PODs that provides,

A health care practitioner, including an immediate family member, shall not:  Enter into a contract or business arrangement with another entity where the purpose or effect of the contract or business arrangement is to accomplish prohibited self-referrals indirectly, such as through the use of a third party, or through the use of a cross-referral agreement. Such prohibited contracts or business arrangements shall include any arrangement that requires or has the purpose or effect of causing the purchase of such medical devices from a specific supplier as a condition of, or incident to the provision of medical care by the health care practitioner.[5]

Are there any legal ways for doctors to make money from device manufacturers?

The short answer is “yes”. The ACA is tough, but it has loopholes that allow medical device manufacturers to enter into arrangements that ultimately provide payments to surgeons who prescribe their products. The method of complying with the law may seem like a maze, but there are now institutions that were established to allow doctors to continue to earn income form non-clinical duties and to be in full compliance with the law.

Sidkoff, Pincus & Green P.C. has worked with many of  its physician clients as well as clients in the chain of medical device manufacturing and distribution to help create alternatives to the now infamous PODs and several other discredited schemes that were popular before passage of the HCA. If you have any interest in learning of our work in this area, feel free to contact us by visiting our web site: www.greatlawyers.com.

[1] Current 10Ks at Feb 2011: Stryker, Zimmer, Biomet indicate 8% of sales spent on R&D

[2] Globus Medical Devices is one such example, surpassing $100 million in sales within 5 years.

[3] The Department of Health and Human Services and The Department of Justice Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009.

[4] Medicaid Integrity Program Report, the HHS Office of Inspector General

[5] New Hampshire,  HOUSE BILL 1725-FN

 

Philadelphia Business Lawyers: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations under Pennsylvania law

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The tort of intentional interference with existing contractual relations is governed by Section 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See Walnut Street Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 982 A.2d 94 (Pa.Super. 2009), aff’d, 610 Pa. 371 (2011).

Section 766 provides: “One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract…between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979).

“The necessary elements of the cause of action are (1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the complainant and a third party; (2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual relationship; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage as a result of defendant’s conduct.”  Walnut Street Associates, Inc., supra at 98; Small v. Juniata College, 682 A.2d 350, 354 (Pa.Super. 1996).

In determining whether a particular course of conduct is improper for purposes of setting forth a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relationships, the court considers: 1) the nature of the actor’s conduct; 2) the actor’s motive; 3) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes; 4) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor; 5) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to interference, and 6) the relationship between the parties.  Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 A.3d 278 (Pa.Super. 2010); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979).

Further, there are specific circumstances in which interference with a contractual relationship is not improper.  For example, one who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not improperly interfere with the other’s contractual relation by giving the third party truthful information or honest advice within the scope of a request for advice.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772 (1979); Walnut Street Associates, Inc., supra.

If you think you might have a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia at 215-574-0600, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Unlawful Access to Stored Communications under Pennsylvania law

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Pennsylvania law provides that “it is an offense to obtain, alter or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage by intentionally: (1) accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) exceeding the scope of one’s authorization to access the facility.”  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5741(a).  Subsection (a) of the statute does not apply, however, with respect to conduct authorized: (1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communication service; (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user; or (3) under certain circumstances related to governmental access (pursuant to sections 5743 and 5744).

A party aggrieved by a violation of Section 5741 can bring a civil cause of action against the person or entity which committed the violation.  See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747; Klump v. Nazareth Area School Dist., 425 F.Supp.2d 622 (E.D.Pa. 2006).  In a civil action under Section 5747, appropriate relief includes: such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; damages (equal to the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000); and reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747(b), (c).

If you think you might have an action under Pennsylvania’s Unlawful Access to Stored Communications statute, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Claims for Damages and Lost Profits in Pennsylvania

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As a general rule, damages need not be proved with mathematical certainty. Nevertheless, sufficient evidence must be produced so that a court can arrive at an intelligent estimate without conjecture. See, Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90, 119, 464 A.2d 1243, 1257-1258 (1984). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving damages by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 118, 464 A.2d at 1257. Loss of profits are recoverable upon proper proof both in contract and tort cases.  Id. at 120, 464 A.2d at 1258. The amount of such damages is an issue of fact to be decided by the fact finder. Id. at 117, 464 A.2d at 1257. See also, Glomb v. Glomb, 366 Pa.Super. 206, 216, 530 A.2d 1362, 1368 (1987); Simmons v. Mullen, 231 Pa.Super. 199, 214, 331 A.2d 892, 900 (1974). The fact finder’s determination of damages “should not be interfered with unless it clearly appears that the amount awarded resulted from partiality, caprice, prejudice, corruption or some other improper influence.” Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., supra 318 Pa.Super. at 117, 464 A.2d at 1257.

Under Pennsylvania law, it is well settled that fixed overhead costs are not properly deductible from lost profits. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519 (1929); Burd v. Campbell Hosiery Co., 150 Pa.Super. 367, 28 A.2d 365 (1942). Fixed overhead costs are costs which are constant in nature, and which would not have been affected by a breach of contract.  The inverse of this principle of law is that variable costs (i.e., those which are not constant in nature) are properly deductible from lost profits in a breach of contract action. See, Kutner Buick v. American Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 617–18 (3d Cir.1989) (“[A]s a matter of both fact and law, fixed costs are irrelevant to the determination of loss of net profit from the determination of a business activity. The only proper focus is revenue generated less variable costs …”).

If you are on either side of a breach of contract or tort claim in Pennsylvania, please feel free to contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, located  in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Civil Conspiracy Claims in Pennsylvania

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“Civil conspiracy occurs when two or more persons combine or agree intending to commit an unlawful act or do an otherwise lawful act by unlawful means.”  Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194, 202 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007).  A plaintiff bringing a civil conspiracy claim is required to aver “material facts which will either directly or inferentially establish elements of conspiracy.”  Id.  Additionally, a plaintiff must allege (1) the persons combined with a common purpose to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or unlawful purpose, (2) an overt act in furtherance of the common purpose has occurred, and (3) the plaintiff has incurred actual legal damage.  Id.  Importantly, absent a civil cause of action for a particular underlying act, there can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy to commit that act.  McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655 (Pa.Super. 2000).

“Proof of malice, i.e., an intent to injure, is an essential part of a conspiracy cause of action; this unlawful intent must also be without justification.”  Reading Radio, Inc. v. Fink, 833 A.2d 199, 212 (Pa.Super. 2003).  Further, all of the elements of a claim for civil conspiracy may be proven circumstantially by subsequent acts of the alleged conspirators, provided that the evidence is “full, clear and satisfactory.”  Id.

If you think you might have an action for a civil conspiracy claim, or if you have been sued for committing civil conspiracy, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Abuse of Process Claims in Pennsylvania

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The tort of “abuse of process” is defined as “the use of legal process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.”  Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa.Super. 2008).  “To establish a claim for abuse of process it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.”  Id. (quoting Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa.Super. 1998)).  “The gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability stated…is imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish.  Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them.  The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the misconduct for which the liability is imposed….”  Lerner, supra at 1238-39 (quoting Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (1993)).

The word “process” as used in the tort of abuse of process “has been interpreted broadly, and encompasses the entire range of procedures incident to the litigation process.”  Id. For example, “process” for purposes of the tort, may include discovery proceedings, the noticing of depositions and the issuing of subpoenas.  Id.  “Abuse of process is, in essence, the use of legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of the process.”  Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 785 (Pa.Super. 2002).

If you think you might have an action for an abuse of process claim, or if you have been sued for abuse of process, please contact the experienced lawyers at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green in Philadelphia, who are licensed to practice law in all courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Survival Actions in Pennsylvania

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The Survival Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302, provides that all causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.  A survival action refers to a personal injury claim, brought by the decedent’s estate, which would have been brought by the decedent had he or she lived. For example, the decedent’s estate may seek to recover for pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to his or her death. In contrast to a wrongful death action, a survival action is not a new cause of action occasioned by the death of the decedent; rather, it is a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff that survives his or her death.  Sunderland v. R.A. Barlow Homebuilders, 2002 PA Super 16, 791 A.2d 384 (2002).

Damages awarded in a survival action are based upon the pecuniary loss that the decedent, and not his or her dependents, suffered. Thus, in survival cases, the action enforces the liability of the tortfeasor to the decedent’s estate, not to his or her relatives or dependents. Damages recovered in a survival action for personal injuries to a decedent are subject to liability for debts because the survival action is a chose belonging to the decedent and passing to decedent’s personal representative with the other assets for administration. In re Lucabaugh’s Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 68, 1951 WL 3452 (Orphans’ Ct. 1951).

For more information related to filing a survival action, please contact an attorney at Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, with offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and attorneys licensed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Call 215-574-0600.